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INTRODUCTION

During the mid-1990s, voters in Maine and Arizona' approved
two of the most comprehensive and ambitious attempts at campaign
finance reform in American history-voluntary systems of full public
I See An Act to Reform Campaign Finance, 1996 Me. Legis. Serv. Initiated Bill Ch. 5
(West) (codified at scattered sections of ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §§ 1121-1128 (Supp.
2006)); Citizens Clean Elections Act, 1998 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Prop. 200 (West) (codified at
ARIZ. REv. STAr. ANN. §§ 16-901.01, -940 to -961 (2006)). Voters in Vermont and Massachusetts have passed similar ballot measures. Full operation of the Vermont system, however,
is prevented by the Supreme Court's decision in Randall v. Sorrell 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006),
which is discussed infra Part I.E., and the state legislature in Massachusetts first refused to

2007]

FULL PUBLIC FUNDING

funding of election campaigns for state offices, coupled with lowered
campaign contribution limits for those who opt not to participate in
the public funding system-termed "Clean Elections." 2 In addition,
in 2002, the North Carolina state legislature passed a full public funding system for the state's appellate and supreme court judges' elections. 3 Although these systems remain relatively new, the initial
results are promising.
Other states and the United States Congress have taken notice.
Based on the initial effectiveness of the Maine, Arizona, and North
Carolina models, advocates of campaign finance reform in dozens of
other states, including California, Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota, New
Jersey, New York, and Wisconsin, are actively working to implement
their own variations of full public funding systems. 4 In fact, on December 7, 2005, Connecticut's Governor M.Jodi Rell signed into law a
comprehensive system of campaign finance reforms that includes public financing for state elected offices. 5 Additionally, Congress commissioned the General Accounting Office to study the early results of the
Clean Elections systems in Maine and Arizona with an eye toward po-6
tentially developing a full public funding system at the national level.
Will the old saying "as goes Maine, so goes the nation" prove correct? The answer to this question depends in large part on the constitutionality and general legal viability of full public funding systems.
One of the main reasons that regulating campaign finance has proven
so difficult is the constant presence of First Amendment free speech
concerns and the resulting constitutional challenges to the public
funding systems. These concerns are further amplified in the context
of full public funding systems, where the government directly disburses funds to candidates for campaigns, raising an additional set of
complex First Amendment issues.
Opponents of full public funding systems have brought various
legal challenges to the systems in Maine, Arizona, North Carolina, and
Connecticut. The potentially high cost of implementing a system that
fund Massachusetts' measure and then repealed the law, see infra text accompanying notes
440-444.
2 The terms "Clean Elections," "full public financing," and "full public funding" are
used interchangeably throughout the remainder of this Note.
3 SeeJudicial Campaign Reform Act, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 158 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 163 (2005)).
4 See, e.g.,
Kaitlin Gurney, N.J. Finds 'CleanElections' Tempting, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
Mar. 19, 2004, at A01; Public Campaign Action Fund, Find Your State Contact, http://www
.publicampaign.org/states/index.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
5
See infra Part II.D.
See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 310, 116 Stat.
6
81, 104 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: EARLY EXPERIENCES OF Two STATES THAT OFFER
FULL PUBLIC FUNDING FOR POLITICAL CANDIDATES 1-3 (2003).
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courts may later invalidate is likely one of the main reasons that other
states have been hesitant to adopt these ambitious systems of reform.
Therefore, both advocates and opponents of reform alike have closely
watched the results of these challenges to the existing systems. By and
large, the courts have upheld the constitutionality of the basic principle underlying full public funding systems. However, judicial treatment varies with respect to any given full public funding system
depending on the specific aspects and operation of that system. This
Note explores these systems and some of the attendant legal challenges with the goal of developing a legally viable and effective full
public funding model for the states and potentially for the nation as a
whole.
Part I of this Note provides an introduction to campaign finance
reform and the concept of public financing. Part II examines the full
public funding systems implemented in Maine, Arizona, and North
Carolina and addresses the effectiveness of and several legal challenges to these systems. Part II also examines the full public-funding
systems approved, but not fully implemented, in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Vermont as well as several of the legal challenges to
these three systems. Finally, Part III proposes a full public funding
model that is most likely to maximize effectiveness and legal viability.
I
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND PUBLIC FUNDING

A.

The Need for Reform

It is appropriate to begin with Democratic politician Jesse Unruh's oft-quoted line, "Money is the mother's milk of politics." 7 Since
the beginning of the Republic, money has played a dominant role in
the American political system by facilitating access to public officials
and leading to the "buying" of influence over policy and regulation.
Scandals involving direct bribery have plagued the nation since its inception. 8 More indirectly, the high costs of campaigns have led all but
the wealthiest candidates to depend heavily on the contributions of
private parties to fund their campaigns, often leading to direct conflicts of interest once a candidate obtains or maintains elected office.
Elected officials often receive campaign contributions from the
same entities that the officials must regulate or contract with in the
officials' capacities as members of the legislative or executive branches
7 See, e.g., Now is the Time for All Good Men, TIME, Jan. 5, 1968, at 44 (quoting Democratic boss Jesse Unruh's characterization of the political process).
8 At the national level, notable campaign financing scandals include the Teapot
Dome Scandal, Tongsun Park (Koreagate), Abscam, and more recently, the Michael ScanIon and Jack Abramoff Indian tribe scandal. For more examples of recent public corruption investigations, see TimothyJ. Burger, TheFBI Gets Tough, TIME,Jan. 23, 2006, at 15-16.
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of government. These officials become "beholden to financial constituencies that contribute to them, and candidates must give them special attention because the contributors will pay for their campaigns."9
Additionally, constituents and elected officials alike are concerned
that politicians spend too much time fundraising and too little time
serving their constituents."' Lastly, the often-prohibitive cost of
campaigning for elected office limits electoral competition."I The
high cost of campaigns limits the ability of many individuals, especially
those who are traditionally without access to established fundraising
networks, to run for and win elected office. Particularly at risk are
challengers to incumbents, women, racial and ethnic minorities, and
12
minor- and third-party candidates.
B.

The Watergate Era

Although political scandals have always lurked in the background, the scandals of the Watergate era, including many state-level
scandals, 13 brought the potential corruption inherent in campaign financing to the forefront of American politics. In 1974, Congress responded by amending the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA) ,14 to implement contribution limits and expenditure limits
for congressional and presidential races, complete the partial public
financing system for presidential elections, and establish the Federal
Election Commission (FEC) as an independent agency to police election practices.15 State legislatures also responded and many adopted
some version of campaign finance laws during the 1970s. 16 Some
9 Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 119 (2d Cir. 2004), rev'd sub nom. Randall v. Sorrell,
126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
10
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-940(B) (8) (2006) ("The people of Arizona find
that our current election-financing system . .. [requires that elected officials spend too
much of their time raising funds rather than representing the public.").
11 See, e.g., id. § 16-940(B) (7) ("The people of Arizona find that our current electionfinancing system ... [d] rives up the cost of running for state office, discouraging otherwise
qualified candidates who lack personal wealth or access to special-interest funding.").
See id.
12
13
See generally DOUG FINKE ET AL., ILLINOIS FOR SALE: Do CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
Buy INFLUENCE? (Dana Heupel ed., 1997) (describing widespread corruption in the Illinois
state government).
14
FECA originally mandated full reporting of campaign contributions and spending
and established the first part of the partial public financing system for presidential elections. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3. For a
brief history of FECA, see Federal Election Commission, The Federal Election Campaign
Laws: A Short History, http://www.fec.gov/info/appfour.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
Congress implemented the partial public financing system in 1973, and the 1976 election
was the first partially publicly financed presidential election. See id.
15
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263.
See HERBERT E. ALEXANDER &JENNIFER W. FRUTIG, PUBLIC FINANCING OF STATE ELEC16
TIONS: A DATA BOOK AND ELECTION GUIDE TO PUBLIC FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND
CANDIDATES IN SEVENTEEN STATES (1982).
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states enacted disclosure laws 17 while others went further and enacted
campaign contribution limits similar to FECA.18 Seventeen states
combined disclosure requirements and contribution limits with systems of partial public financing similar to FECA's presidential matching fund system.1 9
Partial public funding systems were a bold and unique approach
to addressing some of the main impetuses for campaign finance reform. Instead of merely limiting campaign contributions or expenditures, partial public funding systems provided grants of public funds
to candidates who met certain requirements in order to assist with the
often substantial cost of political campaigns. At the time FECA's presidential matching fund system and the states' matching fund systems
were enacted, publicly subsidizing political campaigns was a revolutionary idea in American politics. 20 The rationale underlying public
funding is that an increase in public funding will lessen the influence
of private money in politics, decrease the amount of time that candidates spend fundraising, and expand political access for groups who
traditionally have not had access to well-established fundraising
21
networks.
C.

Landmark Campaign Finance Case: Buckley v. Valeo
In 1976, the Supreme Court ruled on a challenge to the
amended FECA in the landmark campaign finance case of Buckley v.
Valeo.22 Although the Court in Buckley struck down FECA's expenditure limits as an unconstitutional restriction on a candidate's freedom
of speech, 23 the Court upheld the majority of FECA and explicitly
held that providing public matching funds to presidential candidates
24
was constitutional.
17

See ALEXANDER & FRUTIG, supra note 16, at 39-42 (Idaho), 49-54 (Iowa), 227-35

(Rhode Island), 241-48 (Utah).
18 See id. at 25-31 (Hawaii), 59-63 (Kentucky), 69-72 (Maine), 77-84 (Maryland),
91-99 (Massachusetts), 105-13 (Michigan), 121-35 (Minnesota), 145-51 (Montana),
159-70 (NewJersey), 179-90 (North Carolina), 197-205 (Oklahoma), 211-19 (Oregon),
255-68 (Wisconsin).
19 The complete list of states that created some variant of public financing includes
California, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Utah, and Wisconsin. See id. at 5-13. Some of these state programs lapsed or were repealed following their enactment. See id. at 5. For more information on these post-Watergate systems, see generally id.
20
See, e.g., Ruth S. Jones, State Public Campaign Finance:Implicationsfor PartisanPolitics,
25 Am. J. POL. Sci. 342, 343-44 (1980); Jason B. Frasco, A Noble Experiment: The Maine
Clean Election Act 10 (May 2004) (unpublished A.B. thesis, Cornell University) (on file
with Department of Government, Cornell University).
21
See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-940(B) (2006) (enumerating the goals of Arizona's public funding system).
22
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
23
Id. at 39-59.
24
Id. at 85-109.
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The plaintiffs in Buckley argued that Congress's creation of a presidential public financing system violated the General Welfare Clause
of the United States Constitution. 25 The Court held, however, that
the General Welfare Clause was not a limitation on congressional
power, but rather, when correctly interpreted in conjunction with the
26
Necessary and Proper Clause, was a grant of congressional power.
The Court concluded that "Congress has power to regulate Presidential elections and primaries, and public financing of Presidential elections as a means to reform the electoral process was clearly a choice
27
within the granted power."
The Court also upheld the check-off provision of the presidential
public financing system as constitutional. 28 The check-off permitted
taxpayers to designate one or two dollars (depending on their marital
status) of their tax burden (therefore, not increasing their tax liability) to the presidential public financing fund. 29 The Court rejected
the claim that Congress was required to permit taxpayers to designate
which candidates or parties would receive their money, reasoning that
the appropriation from the check-offs was akin to any other congressional appropriation. 30 Therefore, because "every appropriation
made by Congress uses public money in a manner to which some tax31
payers object," the check-off provision was valid.
The Court also held that the public financing system did not violate the First Amendment because it was a "congressional effort not to
abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public money to
facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participationin the electoral
process, goals vital to a self-governing people." 32 The Court concluded that the public financing system "furthers,not abridges,pertinent
33
First Amendment values."

Additionally, the Court held that the presidential public financing system did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment34 because "denial of public financing to some Presidential candidates is not restrictive of voters' rights and less restrictive of
candidates'." 35 To the contrary, the system did not prevent candidates
from getting on the ballot or impede voters from voting for their pref25 The presidential public financing system was challenged as "contrary to the 'general welfare'" under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. Id. at 90.
26 See id.
27 Id. (citations omitted).
28
See id. at 91-92.
29
See id. at 91.
30 See id.
31
Id. at 92.
32 Id. at 92-93 (emphasis added).
33 Id. at 93 (emphasis added).
34 See id. at 93-96.
3
Id. at 94.
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erences. 36 The Court concluded that "Congress [had] enacted [the
presidential public financing system] in furtherance of sufficiently important governmental interests and ha[d] not unfairly or unnecessa37
rily burdened the political opportunity of any party or candidate."
These important governmental interests included "eliminating the improper influence of large private contributions" and providing "an appropriate means of relieving major-party Presidential candidates from
38
the rigors of soliciting private contributions."
39
Lastly, the eligibility requirements for public funding programs
were valid because "Congress' interest in not funding hopeless candidacies with large sums of public money necessarily justifies the withholding of public assistance from candidates without significant
public support."40 In addition (and especially relevant to this Note),
the Court noted that " [t] he States have also been held to have important interests in limiting places on the ballot to those candidates who
demonstrate substantial popular support."4 1 Therefore, the eligibility
requirements for public funding programs were reasonable and
lawful.
Although the Supreme Court later decided several important
campaign finance cases, those cases focused primarily on the constitutionality of contribution limits and none addressed public financing
42
programs.
D.

The Scope of this Note's Analysis

The analysis in this Note focuses on evaluating legal challenges to
full public funding systems with an eye toward developing an effective
and financially viable full public funding model that will withstand
judicial scrutiny. Any model of effective campaign finance reform
must include public financing as the central, if not dominant, compo36

See id.

37
38

Id. at 95-96.
Id. at 96.

39 An individual qualifies as a "candidate" for purposes of the presidential public financing program if he or she is the presidential or vice presidential nominee of a major
party, or if he or she has qualified to have his name on the election ballot as a presidential
or vice presidential candidate of a political party in ten or more states. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 9002(2) (2000).
40 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 96 (internal citations omitted).
41
Id. at 96 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S.
709, 718-19 (1974);Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971); Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23, 31-33 (1968)).
42
See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006) (reaffirming Buckley's approach to
contribution and expenditure limits and invalidating Vermont's expenditure and contribution limits using the Buckley analysis); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upholding
the vast majority of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act); Nixon v. Shrink Mo.
Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (reaffirming Buckley and upholding Missouri's campaign
contribution limits).
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nent of the model. In view of the Buckley decision and the current
composition of the Supreme Court, however, it is fair to assume that
public financing programs will continue to be voluntary to pass constitutional muster. Therefore, any effective system of campaign finance
reform must also address limitations on contributions and expenditures on candidates who choose not to participate in public funding
systems. These restrictions and their constitutionality, however, are
beyond the scope of this Note because they have little bearing on the
operation of the public funding aspects of these reforms. Accordingly, the Court's plurality opinions in Randallv. Sorrell,43 for example,
as well as the other cases that address the constitutionality of expenditure limitations and low contribution limits do not affect this analysis.
Nonetheless, the Randall case is important insofar as it demonstrates
the continuing validity of the Buckley decision.
E.

The Court Reaffirms Important Aspects of Buckley in Randall
v. Sorrell

In 1997, the Vermont legislature passed an aggressive reform to
the state's campaign finance laws. 44 The newly amended law provided
a voluntary full public funding system for the offices of governor and
lieutenant governor; 45 lowered contribution limits for individuals, political action committees (PACs), political parties, and corporations to
the lowest level in the country; 46 and imposed expenditure limits on
candidates who chose not to participate in the system. 4 7 The system's
expenditure limits clearly violated the Court's holding in Buckley that
expenditure limits were unconstitutional restrictions on free speech
rights, resulting in an immediate challenge to the law by a group of
former candidates, voters, political parties, and committees. 48 The
district court upheld the constitutionality of the lowered contribution
limits on individual, corporate, and PAC contributions but invalidated
the contribution limits on political parties and corporations as unconstitutionally low. 4 9 The district court also held, unsurprisingly, that

the expenditure limits were unconstitutional. 50 The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's ruling that the expenditure limits were
unconstitutional but upheld all of the contribution limits, including
See infra Part I.E.
See An Act Relating to Public Financing of Election Campaigns, 1997 Vt. Acts &
Resolves 64 (codified at Vermont Campaign Reform Finance Act of 1997, VT. STAT. ANN.
it. 17, §§ 2801-2883 (2002)).
45
See id. § 2 (amending tit. 17, §§ 2854-2856).
46
See id. § 1(a)(8)-(9).
47
See id. § 7 (amending tit 17, § 2805a).
48
See Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462 (D. Vt. 2000).
43

44

49
50

See id. at 463-64.
See id.
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the limits on political parties and corporations that the district court
5 1
declared unconstitutional.
A plurality of the Supreme Court reversed, holding that both the
expenditure limits and the contribution limits violated the First
Amendment.52 First, with respect to the expenditure limits, the plurality emphasized the continuing vitality of the Buckley decision, noting that "[o]ver the last 30 years, in considering the constitutionality
of a host of different campaign-finance statutes, this Court has repeatedly adhered to Buckley's constraints, including those on expenditure
limits." 53 Relying on the principles established in Buckley, the plurality
held that the Vermont expenditure limits violated the First Amendment. 54 The plaintiffs' arguments that the assumptions underlying
the Buckley decision no longer applied and that the current case was
55
distinguishable from Buckley ultimately failed to persuade the Court.
Second, with respect to the contribution limits, the plurality
again found the principles in Buckley to be controlling. 5 6 Although
Buckley permitted contribution limits that were "'closely drawn' to
match a 'sufficiently important interest,'- 57 the contribution limits in
the Vermont system were, "from a constitutional perspective .... too
restrictive." 58 The limits themselves were extremely low, and the plurality was also concerned about the "statute's effect on political parties
59
and on volunteer activity in Vermont elections."
Although the opinion did not address the public financing aspect
of the system, the plurality's reaffirmation of the other main aspects of
Buckley tacitly reflects that the public financing principles of Buckley
remain valid.
F.

The Failure of Matching Fund Systems

After the thirty years that most state matching funds systems have
been in place, the consensus of the limited number of studies in this
area is that the systems are ineffective. 60 However, the studies do re51
See Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 148 (2d Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom. Randall v.
Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
52
See Randa//,126 S. Ct. at 2485 (plurality opinion).
53
Id. at 2488 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 134 (2003); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528
U.S. 377, 386 (2000)).
54
See id. at 2487-91.
55
See id. at 2489-91.
56
See id. at 2491-92.
57
Id. at 2491 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam)).
58
Id. at 2495.
59
60

Id.

See, e.g.,
MICHAELJ.

MALBIN

&

THOMAS

L.

GAIS, THE DAY AFTER REFORM: SOBERING

CAMPAIGN FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES

158 (1998).
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veal that "money-whatever the source-clearly does help" because it
6
helps slightly to narrow the incumbent-challenger monetary gap. '
Although a matching fund system certainly can assist a candidate's campaign, these systems present several problems. First, even if
a candidate can meet the threshold fundraising level necessary to trigger matching funds, the matching funds are typically far from sufficient to compete viably in a contested election. 62 This creates a
disincentive for individuals to run in the first place. 63 Second, matching funds do nothing to enable segments of the population that traditionally have not had full access to fundraising networks, including
challengers to incumbents, women, third parties, and minorities, to
enter races for elected office because the candidates still need to meet
a threshold fundraising level to qualify for matching funds. Lastly,
these " [p] rograms have to be sustained in an atmosphere quite different from the one that prevailed when they were adopted," 64 thus creating an uphill political battle for their continued operation and
enforcement.
Many supporters of campaign finance reform have long asserted
that full public funding is the only reform that will effectively limit the
influence of money in politics and the only reform that will actually
enhance electoral competition by "leveling the playing field. ' 65 The
apparent failures of the partial matching fund systems helped validate
this conclusion.
II
STATE SYSTEMS AND LEGAL CHALLENGES

A.

Maine
1. Maine Clean Elections Act

In 1996, voters in Maine approved the Maine Clean Elections Act
(MCEA) by ballot initiative. 66 The MCEA created the Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices (Ethics Commission), an appointed body that administers Maine's campaign finance
laws, including MCEA. 67 The MCEA takes a two-part approach to reform, using (1) a voluntary full public funding system for campaigns
61

62
63
64
65

See id.
See id. at 164.
See id.
Id.

E.g., Richard Briffault, Reforming Campaign Finance Reform: A Review of Voting with
Dollars, 91 CAL. L. Rav. 643, 683 (2003) (explaining that one of the goals of public funding
is to "level the playing field").
66 SeeAn Act to Reform Campaign Finance, 1996 Me. Legis. Serv. Initiated Bill Ch. 5
(West) (codified at scattered sections of ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §§ 1121-1128 (Supp.
2006)).
67 See id. § I (amending tit. 1, § 1002).

744
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for the state legislature and governor's office, 68 and (2) a system of
lower contribution limits for all state offices ($500 for gubernatorial
candidates and $250 for all other offices).69
To run for elected office, all candidates must first register their
candidacies and receive a certain number of signatures from their districts. 70 These requirements are standard for running for elected of-

fice in the United States.
If a candidate chooses to engage in traditional private fundraising
and not to participate in the public funding system, he or she may
proceed to raise an unlimited amount of private funds provided that
the contributions comply with the contribution ceilings imposed by
the MCEA. 7 1 Additionally, in compliance with Buckley, a nonparticipating candidate may also contribute an unlimited amount of per72
sonal wealth toward the campaign.
Alternatively, a candidate may choose to participate in the full
public funding system. Importantly, to comply with Buckley, participation in the program must be entirely voluntary. At the campaign's outset, a "participating candidate" 73 may accept limited private
contributions denoted as "seed money contributions" 74 to assist the
candidate with the next step of the process, "qualifying contributions." 75 Candidates may only collect their seed money contributions
from individuals; seed money contributions may not exceed $100 per
contributor (including the candidate and the candidate's family); and
the total amount of seed money is limited to $500 for state house
candidates, $1,500 for state senate candidates, and $50,000 for guber76
natorial candidates.
Then, to qualify for public funds, a candidate must "demonstrate
a threshold amount of community support"7 7 by gathering donations
in the form of "qualifying contributions." The MCEA defines qualifying contributions as $5 checks or money orders made payable to the
Maine Clean Election Fund by "registered voter[s] within the electoral division for the office a candidate is seeking[, m]ade during the
68
69

See id.§ 17 (amending tit.
21-A, § 1122(2)).
See id. § 11. Again, this Note will not evaluate the lowered contribution limits
prong of MCEA, tit. 21-A, § 1005.
70
See ME. DEP'T OF THE SEC'Y OF STATE, A CANDIDATE'S GUIDE TO RUNNING FOR OFFICE
IN MAINE 6 (2004) (on file with author). The number of signatures required varies based
on the office sought. See id.
71
See tit. 21-A, § 1005, 1122(5).
72

See id.

73 Id. § 1122(6).
74 Id. § 1122(9).
75 Id. § 1122(7).
76 See id.§§ 1122(9), 1125(2).
77 State of Me. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, Qualifying
Contributions, http://www.maine.gov/ethics/mcea/qualify.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2007).
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designated qualifying period and obtained with the knowledge and
approval of the candidate. 7 8 State house candidates must collect a
minimum of 50 of these "qualifying contributions," 79 state senate candidates must collect a minimum of 150,80 and gubernatorial candidates must collect a minimum of 2,500.81

The collections must be

made during the "qualifying period," which is typically from November (for a gubernatorial participating candidate) or January (for state
senate or state house participating candidates) through mid-March of
82
the election year.
Once a candidate collects the requisite number of qualifying contributions, submits a request for public funds, and receives certification from the Ethics Commission for his or her public funding
participation, the participating candidate must comply with certain requirements. 83 First, the candidate must not accept any additional contributions, including any private contributions, in-kind contributions,
or contributions from the candidate himself or herself.8 4 Second, all
of the candidate's future campaign expenditures must come from
85
public funds.
The Ethics Commission initially distributes funds based on several factors: (1) the "average amount of campaign expenditures made
by each candidate during all ...

primary election races for the imme-

diately preceding [two] primary elections," (2) whether the election is
a primary or general election, and (3) whether the race is contested
or uncontested. 8 6 The chart below reflects the initial public funds distributions during the 2006 elections.
TABLE

1.

INITIAL PUBLIC FUNDS DISTRIBUTIONS FOR MAINE
STATE OFFICES

Office

Primary Election

Primary Election

Contested Seat

Uncontested Seat

Governor

General Election General Election
Contested Seat

Uncontested Seat

$200,000

$200,000

$400,000

$400,000

State Representative

$1,504

$512

$4,362

$1,745

State Senator

$7,746

$1,927

$20,082

Source:

STATE

CANwIDATE'S

OF

ME.

COMM'N

GUIDE: RUNNING

ON

FOR OFFICE

IN MAINE

$8,033

2006
38 (2006), http://www.maine.gov/ethics/

GOVERNMENTAL

ETHICS

&

ELECTION

PRACTICES,

pdf/2006 candidate-guide.pdf.

78

Tit. 21-A, § 1122(7).

79

Id. § 1125(3) ().

80
81
82

Id. § 1125 (3) (B).
Id.§ 1125(3) (A).
See id.§ 1122(8).
83
See id.§ 1125.
84
See id. § 1125(6); STATE OF ME. COMM'N ON GOVERNMENTAL ETHICS & ELECTION
PRACTICES, 2006 CANDIDATE'S GUIDE: RUNNING FOR OFFICE IN MAINE 14 (2006), http://
mainegov-images.informe.org/ethics/PDF/P49.pdf [hereinafter ME. CANDIDATE'S GUIE].
85
See ME. CANDIDATE'S GUIDE, supra note 84.

86

Tit. 21-A, § 1125(8).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:733

Furthermore, as a response to the concern that participating candidates would be disadvantaged if they run against nonparticipating
candidates, "[p]articipating Clean Elections candidates are also eligible for additional matching funds on a dollar-for-dollar basis if they
are outspent by privately funded opponents or are the target of inde87 This matching fund system operates on
pendent expenditures... ...
a disclosure trigger: if a nonparticipating candidate is running against
a participating candidate, the nonparticipating candidate must report
within forty-eight hours any amount that he or she receives or spends
exceeding 1% above the participating candidate's initial public funds
distribution. 88 For example, if a candidate in a state senate primary
receives $6,000 and the nonparticipating candidate raises or spends
over $6,060 (1% more than $6,000), the nonparticipating candidate
must report this to the Ethics Commission within forty-eight hours of
surpassing the limit.8 9 If the nonparticipating candidate were to raise
$8,000, the commission would then provide $2,000 worth of matching
funds to the participating candidate. 90 Similarly, if an organization
were to spend $3,000 on an independent television expenditure attacking a participating candidate, the expenditure would have to be
disclosed and the participating candidate would receive $3,000 in
matching funds.9 1 Ultimately, however, the MCEA limits the matching funds that will be disbursed to a participating candidate equal to
92
twice the initial distribution to the participating candidate.
Three main sources and several additional minor sources combine to fund the Maine program. First, the qualifying contributions
that candidates collect go directly into the Maine Clean Election
Fund. 93 Second, the state allocates $2 million of tax revenues to the
fund each year. 94 Third, each resident may allocate $3 of his or her
state tax burden to the fund via a tax check-off program. 9 5 In addition to the main sources of funding, any unspent seed money contributions, unspent public funds, voluntary donations, and fines for
87

MARc BRESLOW ET AL., REVITALIZING DEMOCRACY- CLEAN ELECTION REFORM SHOWS

THE WAY FORWARD 14 (2002), http://www.neaction.org/revitalizingdemocracy.pdf. Independent expenditures are expenditures that individuals and organizations that are at least
theoretically uncoordinated with any candidate's campaign make in support of or in opposition to a candidate.
88 See tit. 21-A, § 1017.
89
See id.; ME. CANDIDATE'S GUIDE, supra note 84, at 16.
90

See ME. CANDIDATE'S GUIDE, supra note 84, at 16.

91

See id.

92

See tit. 21-A, § 1125(9).

Indeed, the checks are written directly to the Maine Clean Election Fund. See tit.
21-A, § 1124 (2)(A).
94 See id. § 1124(2)(B).
95 See id. § 1124(2) (C).
93
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campaign finance law violations may provide revenue for the
96
program.
2.

Maine Results

The initial results of the MCEA are promising. Participation in
the public funding system is extremely high; in the 2004 general election, 78% of candidates participated in the program. 97 Such involvement, coupled with the new $250 maximum contribution limit, has
significantly decreased aggregate levels of direct-to-candidate private
contributions, one of the most powerful avenues of monetary influence in the political system. 98 For example, between the 1998 and
2002 elections, direct contributions of private funds to Maine Senate
candidates declined by about 60%, and direct contributions to Maine
House of Representatives candidates dropped by 55%. 99
Additionally, public funding has helped reduce Maine's elected
officials' dependence on large campaign donors, resulting in a more
effective and unencumbered democracy. Currently, over 75% of the
Maine Senate and over 50% of the Maine House of Representatives
were elected relying on public funds.1 00 As a result, candidates and
elected officials report that they are now able to spend significantly
more time reaching a larger number of constituents instead of focusing on potential large donors. For example, State Senator Susan
Longley commented, "After a few months of doing [public funding], I
was realizing how it was wonderfully shifting my focus more completely back to my constituency." 10 1 Other legislators have echoed
10 2

this sentiment.

Furthermore, if challengers choose to participate in the system
and qualify for public funds, the system effectively eliminates the incumbent-challenger fundraising gap that has resulted in astronomically high incumbent reelection rates for many years (98% in some
instances) .103
Finally, by providing campaign funds to individuals who traditionally have not had open access to fundraising networks, the system is
96

See id. § 1124(2)(D)-(H).

ME. CITIZENS FOR CLEAN ELECTIONS, 2002-2004 GENERAL ELECTION COMPARISON 1
(2005), http://www.mainecleanelections.org/pdfs/CE2004GeneraLAnalysisresults.pdf.
98 See Frasco, supra note 20, at 139.
97

99
100

See id.
ME. CITIZENS FOR CLEAN ELECTIONS, MAINE CLEAN ELECTIONS: RECLAIMING OUR DE-

MOCRACY

(2004), http://www.mainecleanelections.org/pdfs/mccebrochure2004final.pdf.

101

PUBLIC CAMPAIGN, THE ROAD TO CLEAN ELECTIONS 3 (2001).

102

See id.

1o

See Frasco, supra note 20, at 140-41.
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better enabling candidates from more diverse backgrounds to run for
10 4
political office.
3.

Notable Legal Challenges to the Maine System
a. Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics & Election
Practices

In Daggett v. Commission on GovernmentalEthics & Election Practices,
legislative candidates, campaign contributors, PACs, and the Maine
Libertarian Party challenged the public funding system, asserting that
10 5
the system unconstitutionally coerced candidates to participate.
The district court held that the public funding system was constitutional. 10 6 After evaluating the MCEA under the principles announced
10 7
in Buckley, the First Circuit affirmed.
Specifically, the Daggett plaintiffs asserted that the matching fund
provision for independent expenditures violates the First Amendment
political speech and associational rights of nonparticipating candidates and of noncandidates who wanted to make independent expenditures.10 8 The court noted that the plaintiffs' argument "boil [ed]
down to a claim of a First Amendment right to outraise and outspend
an opponent, a right that they complain is burdened by the matching
funds clause." 10 9 The plaintiffs also contended that independent expenditures should not qualify as campaign contributions because independent expenditures traditionally enjoy greater First Amendment
protection. 1 10 Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the matching fund
provision infringed on their freedom of association rights because it
"force [d] them to be associated with candidates they oppose [d] by in
effect facilitating their speech.""1
The court first noted that direct limitations on independent expenditures were unconstitutional under Buckley, but that such cases
were of "limited application .

because they involve [d] direct mone-

104 See id. at 141.
105
See 205 F.3d 445, 450 (1st Cir. 2000). The plaintiffs also challenged the constitutionality of the new contribution limits for nonparticipating candidates. Because this Note
focuses on the public funding systems, it will not address the challenges to the contribution
limits. For a discussion of the constitutionality of the contribution limits, see Theodore
Lazarus, The Maine Clean Election Act: CleansingPublic Institutionsof PrivateMoney, 34 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 79, 117-21 (2000).
106 Daggett, 205 F.3d at 450.
107 See id. The court noted that the Buckley principles were affirmed in Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000). See id. Other than this affirmation, Nixon is
beyond the scope of this Note because it addresses the constitutionality of contribution
limitations.
108 See id. at 463-64.
109 Id. at 464.
110 See id.
111

Id.
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tary restrictions on independent expenditures, which inherently burden such speech"; the MCEA, in contrast, "create[d] no direct
restriction."' 12
The court then held that the matching fund provisions did not
indirectly burden a donor's speech or associational rights, reasoning
that the plaintiffs "have no right to speak free from response-the
purpose of the First Amendment is 'to secure the widest possible dis11 3
semination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources."'
The court concluded that "[t] he public funding system in no way limits the quantity of speech one can engage in or the amount of money
one can spend engaging in political speech, nor does it threaten cen1 4
sure or penalty for such expenditures."'
Lastly, the court held that "merely because the Fund provide[d]
funds to match both campaign donations and independent expenditures made on behalf of the candidate d [id] not mean that the statute
equate[d] the two."'11 The court further noted that the plaintiffs'
"freedom of association [was] not burdened because their names and
messages [were] not associated-in any way indicative of supportwith the candidate they oppose[d].""16
The court then evaluated the plaintiffs' First Amendment argument that the MCEA's reporting requirement for independent expenditures aggregating over $50 was overly burdensome and would
have a chilling effect on independent speakers." t 7 The court noted
that in Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld a reporting requirement
for independent expenditures exceeding $100 in a calendar year. Accordingly, the court was unconvinced that $50 was unreasonable for
18
elections in Maine.1
The court then evaluated the general argument against the public funding system itself-that the system was impermissibly coercive
because it "provide[d] so many incentives to participate and so many
detriments to foregoing participating that it leaves a candidate with
no reasonable alternative but to seek qualification as a publicly
112

Id.

113 Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,49 (1976) (per curiam)). The plaintiffs
had relied on Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994), a case in which the Eighth
Circuit held that a campaign finance provision that increased a participating candidate's
expenditure limits based on independent expenditures, or in some circumstances
matched those expenditures, was unconstitutional. Id. The court in Daggert rejected the
reasoning in Day because it "equate [d] responsive speech with an impairment to the initial
speaker" and therefore conflicted with its conclusion in the instant case. See id. at 465.
114

Id. at 464.

115

Id. at 465.

116

Id.

117

See id.

118

See id. at 466.
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funded candidate."' 19 The court noted that although the Supreme
Court upheld voluntary public financing systems in Buckley,1 20 it also
made clear that a public financing system could be unconstitutional if
it "'burdens the exercise of political speech' but is not 'narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."121

The first question was whether the public funding system allowed
candidates to make a "voluntary" choice about whether to participate
in the public funding system. 122 The court noted that a state could
create incentives to participate in exchange for the candidate's agreement not to rely on private fundraising. 123 The test for whether the
system is "voluntary," however, is whether the system achieves "a rough
proportionality between the advantages available to complying candidates ...

and the restrictions that such candidates must accept to re-

ceive those advantages."1 24 In other words, the test asks whether "the
state exact[ed] a fair price from complying candidates in exchange
for the receipt of the challenged benefits." 12 5 Finally, the court observed the Supreme Court's holding that candidates and supporters'
First Amendment rights are not violated "[a] s long as the candidate
remains free to engage in unlimited private funding and spending,
".."126
instead of limited public funding ..
The plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the public financing system
was not actually voluntary because, in addition to depriving "non-participants of the benefits of participation," the system "penalizes them
for not participating. " 127 They argued that because the benefits of
participating in the public funding program are so high, there was
actually "no meaningful choice" available to a candidate but to participate in the program. 128 Some of the alleged excessive benefits were
the matching fund mechanism and the labeling of participating can129
didates as "clean."
The First Circuit rejected each of these arguments and in doing
so provided important guidelines for future public financing systems
to follow. First, the court upheld the MCEA's matching fund provision. 130 The court noted that matching funds did not "create an ex119

Id.

120

See id.

121
122

Id. (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990)).
Id. at 467 (citing Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 38-39 (1st Cir. 1993)).

123

See id.

124

Id. (quoting Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 39).

125

Id.

126

Id. (quoting Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), affd mem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980)).
127
128
129

Id.
Id.
Id.

130

See id. at 468-70.
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ceptional benefit to the participating candidate" because they were
capped at only twice the initial disbursement.1 3 t This limit, the court
observed, enabled a nonparticipating candidate to "outspend [his or]
32
participating opponent with abandon after the limit is reached."
The court also sought guidance from two other circuits.' 33 The First
Circuit agreed with the views expressed in these decisions and held
that the matching fund provision did not rise to the level of "impermissible coercion. 1

34

The court further noted that eliminating the

matching fund mechanism would open the door for independent expenditures that could defeat "the state's goal of distributing roughly
proportionate funding, albeit with a limit, to publicly funded
1

candidates."

35

Second, the court addressed the plaintiffs' concern that the use
of the term "clean" to describe participating candidates disparages
nonparticipants.136 The court noted that the Ethics Commission did
candidates as "clean" but instead used the term
not label participating
1 37
"participating.'

The court also noted that because "such labeling is

not required or sanctioned by the statute nor within the authority of
the statute to control[,] .

sion

will not serve

candidates."

38

.

. any labeling performed by the Commis-

as a

substantial

benefit to

participating

Third, the court held that the cumulative effect of the entire system-and not just the matching fund mechanism-was not coercive. 139 The court observed that "a 'state need not be completely
neutral on the matter of public financing of elections' and that a public funding scheme need not achieve an 'exact balance' between benefits and detriments." 140 Furthermore, the court concluded that to be
viable, a voluntary public financing system must offer incentives to 4encourage candidates to participate in the system in the first place.1 '
131
132

Id. at 468.
Id.

133 See id. at 469 (discussing Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998) and Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544 (8th Cir. 1996)). In Gable, the Sixth Circuit upheld a
public financing matching fund provision that was far more beneficial than the MCEA's
provision. The Sixth Circuit held that although the matching fund mechanism provided a
"substantial advantage" for participating candidates, it did not rise to the forbidden level of
coercion. In Rosenstiel, the Eighth Circuit held that a matching fund provision was not
coercive because a nonparticipating candidate, in effect, controls his or her participating
opponent's funding.
134
See id.
135
Id. at 469-70.
Id. at 470.
136
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
See id. at 472.
Id. at 470 (quoting Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 39 (1st Cir. 1993)).
140
See id.
141
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With respect to the MCEA, the court noted that the benefits of
participating "are accompanied by significant burdens," among them
the inability to fundraise privately, the need to collect seed money and
qualifying contributions, the limits on the amount of public funding a
candidate may receive, an unknown amount and timing for distribution of matching funds, and a limit on matching funds. 14 2 Accordingly, the court concluded that "the incentives for a Maine candidate
[to participate] . .. are hardly overwhelming," and that furthermore,
1 43
there are "significant encumbrances on participating candidates."
The court held that when combined, there was a "roughly proportionate mix of benefits and detriments to candidates seeking public funding, such that it does not burden the First Amendment rights of
'1 44
candidates or contributors."
b.

National Right to Life PoliticalAction Committee State Fund v.
Devine

In National Right to Life PoliticalAction Committee State Fund v. Devine, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a MCEA provision. 145 The challenged provision doubled lobbyist registration fees
from $200 to $400 for lobbyists and from $100 to $200 for lobbyist
associates, and provided that half of the revenue would go to the Eth46
ics Commission and the other half to the Maine General Fund.
Two organizations that engage in lobbying, the Maine Campowners
Association (MECOA) and the Maine Civil Liberties Union (MCLU),
contended that the registration fees constituted "an unlawful tax on
the First Amendment activities of MECOA, MCLU, and other employers of lobbyists to the extent the fees are excessive and are used for purposes
other than to defray the administrative costs of lobbyist registration and
' 147
regulation."
The defendants argued that the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) precluded the challenge.1 48 The TIA is a federal statute that prohibits
district courts from "enjoin [ing], suspend [ing,] or restrain [ing] the
assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain,
speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such
142

See id. at 471.

143

Id. at 472.

144

Id.

Nat'l Right to Life Political Action Comm. State Fund. v. Devine, No. 96-359-P-H,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12637, at *1 (D. Me., Aug. 8, 1997).
146
See id. at *2 (discussing the challenge to ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 313, 320
(Supp. 2006)).
147
See id. (quoting Amended Complaint at 33, Nat'l Right to Life, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12637) (emphasis added by court).
148 See id.
145
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State." 149 Although the district court ultimately concluded that the
registration fee is a tax, and that the court therefore lacked jurisdiction to resolve the dispute, the court's discussion of why the registration fee is a tax is relevant to the broader issue of funding public
funding systems.
The court first noted that because the charge is termed a "registration fee" and applies only to lobbyists, a relatively small and distinct
group of people, it is unlike a tax. 1 50 However, the court then noted
that the fee was imposed by the legislature after a ballot initiativenot by an administrative agency-and that half of the fee is paid to the
Maine General Fund. Because the Maine General Fund benefits the
entire state, the charge is more like a tax.15 1 The court also noted the
absence of evidence indicating that the fee serves the regulatory purpose of discouraging lobbying, and that "[e]ven the money that goes
to the Commission is broadly used for more than regulation of lobbyists."1 5 2 The court referenced MCEA, which indicated that lobbyists
fees contribute to "'support[ing] enhanced monitoring [and enforcement of election practices] and computerizing data collection [to
track campaign, election, and lobbying information under the Commission's jurisdiction].' "153
The plaintiffs conceded that if the registration fee represented a
charge for regulatory expenses alone, the fee would be constitutional. 15 4 Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff's challenge was restricted to the amounts over a "reasonable levy," which in
this case was half the revenue from the fees that went to the Maine
General Fund. 15 5 Because the revenues went to the Maine General
Fund, the fee constituted a tax measure, and the TIA precluded the
federal court from granting jurisdiction to the claim. 156 State courts,
therefore, were the appropriate forum in which to challenge the
tax. 157
c.

Lessons from the Maine Cases

The MCEA survived the Daggett court with all of its provisions intact, thereby establishing the first major, legally viable system of full
public funding. In doing so, Daggett provides several important guide149
28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000). For a recent discussion of the TIA and its origin, see
Brianne J. Gorod, Comment, Limiting the FederalForum: The Dangers of an Expansive Interpretation of the Tax Injunction Act, 115 YALE L.J. 727, 729-30 (2005).
15O
Nat'l Right to Life, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12637, at *4.
151
See id.
Id. at *4-5.
152
Id. at *5 (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1008(6) (Supp. 2006)).
153
154
See id. at *6.
155
Id.
See id. at *6-7.
156
157
See id. at *7.
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lines for future public funding systems. First, a matching fund system
should have limits to prevent a participating candidate from procuring a disproportionate advantage that may cause the matching fund
mechanism to rise to the level of impermissible coercion. Second, although supporters of public funding systems may extol the virtues of
public funding and encourage candidate participation in such systems, the enacting statute and' the government body responsible for
administering the program should refrain from labeling participating
candidates as "clean" candidates. Likewise, the government body and
any of its members should avoid characterizing participating candidates as better or more "clean" than nonparticipating candidates.
Otherwise, such labeling may create a substantial benefit to participating candidates, which, in turn, can rise to the level of impermissible
coercion. Lastly, a full public funding system must carefully balance
the incentives and benefits of participation in the system with the
meaningful detriments and burdens of participation in the system. As
the Daggett court made clear, a failure to do so may threaten the First
Amendment rights of nonparticipating candidates and contributors.
In addition, National Right to Life teaches two critical lessons.
First, any mandatory registration fees that are used to help fund full
public financing systems should be designated for regulatory enforcement rather than for general funding of the system. If a fee does not
reflect regulatory expenses alone, the fee will lose its presumption of
constitutionality. Second, if any portion of the mandatory fees
charged to lobbyists or other individuals or organizations involved in
the political system is used to help fund a public funding system and is
allocated toward the state's general coffers, the relevant provisions
should comply with state-not federal-law and precedent on permissible taxation.
B.

Arizona
1. Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act

In 1998, Arizona voters implemented a full public funding system
when they approved the Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act
(CCEA).158 Similar to Maine's MCEA, the CCEA combines a voluntary full public funding system with lowered contribution limits for
individuals who choose not to participate in the program. 159 Like the
MCEA, the CCEA authorized the creation of a commission, the Citizens Clean Election Commission (CCEC), to administer the pro158
See 1998 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Prop. 200 (West) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
901.01, -940 to -961 (2006)).
159
See Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-901.01, -940 to -961 (2006); see also BRESLOW

§§

16-

ET AL.,

supra note 87, at 17 (noting that CCEA reduces by 20% the amount that an individual may
contribute to a candidate's campaign).
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gram. 160 The coverage of Arizona's program, however, is broader in
scope than Maine's program. In addition to covering the office of the
governor and the state legislature, Arizona's program covers the secretary of state, the attorney general, the state treasurer, the superintendent of public instruction, the corporation commission, and the mine
inspector. 16' The Arizona law follows MCEA's lead by permitting candidates to raise a limited amount of seed money to assist with the collection of qualifying contributions. 1 62 The seed money must come
from individuals; cannot exceed $100 per person; and is capped at
$40,000 for governor, $20,000 for attorney general and secretary of
state, $10,000 for the corporation commission, and $2,500 for the
state legislature. 163 Like candidates in Maine, Arizona candidates
must collect a certain number of qualifying contributions during a
specified period to qualify for the program.164
TABLE 2.

QUALIFYING CONTRIBUTIONS REQUIRED FOR SELECTED
ARIZONA STATE OFFICES

Office

Qualifying Contributions Required

Governor

4,000

Secretary of State
Attorney General

2,500

Treasurer
Corporation Commission
Superintendent of Public Instruction

1,500

State Senate and State House

Source: ARIz. REv.

STAT.

200

§ 16-950 (2006).

Like Maine's system, once a candidate receives approval for public funding participation, he or she must agree to not accept any additional contributions, including private contributions, in-kind
65
contributions, or any contributions from the candidate personally.
The candidate must further agree that all campaign expenditures
166
come from public funds.

The CCEC initially distributes funds based on several factors:
party status, whether the election is a primary or general election, and

160
161

162
163
164
165
166

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-955 (2006).
id. § 16-950(D).
id. § 16-945.
id.
id. § 16-950(D).
id. §§ 16-941, 16-947(B)(3), 16-950(A).
id. § 16-948.
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whether the race is contested or uncontested. 16 7 The initial public
funds distributions for the 2006 elections appear in the chart below.
TABLE

3.

INITIAL. PUBLIC FUNDS DISTRIBUTIONS FOR ARIZONA

PARTY

CANDIDATES (SELECTED OFFICES)
Primary
Election
Contested

Primary
Election
Uncontested

General
Election
Contested

General
Election
Uncontested

$453,849

$5 Qualifying
Contributions
Only

$680,774

$5 Qualifying
Contributions
Only

Secretary of State
Attorney General

$95,550

$5 Qualifying
Contributions
Only

$167,213

$5 Qualifying
Contributions
Only

Treasurer
Corporation Commission
Superintendent of Public Instruction

$47,770

$5 Qualifying
Contributions

Office

Governor

State Senate and State House

$11,945

$5 Qualifying

Only

$5 Qualifying
Contributions
Only

Source: STATE OF ARIZ. CITIZENS CLEAN ELECTIONS COMM'N, supra note 167, at 36, 39.

As the chart below indicates, independent candidates receive
70% of the sum of the original primary election spending limit and
the original general election spending limit instead of two separate
168
distributions.
TABLE 4.

INITIAL PUBLIC FUNDS DISTRIBUTIONS FOR ARIZONA

INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES (SELECTED OFFICES)
Office

Contested Seat

Uncontested Seat

Governor

$794,306

$5 Qualifying Contributions Only

Secretary of State
Attorney General

$167,213

$5 Qualifying Contributions Only

$ 83,598

$5 Qualifying Contributions Only

$ 20,904

$5 Qualifying Contributions Only

Treasurer
Corporation Commission
Superintendent of Public Instruction
State Senate and State House

Source: STATE OF ARIZ. CITIZENS CLEAN ELECTIONS COMM'N, supra note 167, at 35.

Again, as in Maine, in the event that participating candidates are
"outspent by privately funded opponents or are the target of independent expenditures" after they have received their initial distributions
167 See id. § 16-951 (A). There are also special provisions for candidates who are members of the dominant party in a one-party-dominant district. These types of candidates
have the option to shift funds from the general election to the primary election. See STATE
OF ARIZ. CITIZENS CLEAN ELECTIONS COMM'N, PARTICIPATING CANDIDATE GUIDE: 2005-2006
ELECTION CYCLE 45 (2005), http://www.azcleanelections.gov/ccecweb/ccecays/docs/2006
ParticipatingCandidateGuide.pdf.
168
See STATE OF ARIZ. CITIZENS CLEAN ELECTIONS COMM'N, supra note 167, at 35.
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of public funds, they are eligible for matching funds. 1 69 The matching funds are triggered by a required disclosure of the opponent's
fundraising or expenditures above the initial distribution or by a disclosure of an independent expenditure attacking the candidate or
supporting the candidate's opponent. 70 In Arizona, the limit on
matching funds is three times-compared to Maine's limit of two
7
times-the initial distribution to the participating candidate.' '

Lastly, the funding sources for Arizona's program differ from the
funding sources for Maine's program. Although Arizona, like Maine,
employs a tax check-off ($5 instead of $3),172 uses the funds collected
from the qualifying contributions, 73 and uses fines collected for campaign finance law violations, 174 Arizona additionally finances the system through a dollar-for-dollar tax credit on its state income tax
form, 175 a 10% surcharge on all civil penalties and criminal fines, 1 7 6
1 77
and fees charged to lobbyists.

2.

Arizona Results

Like the results in Maine, the results in Arizona have been promising. In 2002, more than 57% of all candidates participated in the
public funding system.' 78 Public funds comprised over 50% of the
total money in 2002 Arizona legislative campaigns. 79 In the same
year, seven out of nine statewide officers, including the governor, as
well as twenty-seven Arizona state house members and five Arizona
state senate members (in total, 36% of the legislature) won election
using public funds. 180 In 2004, ten out of eleven statewide officers,
again including the governor, won election using public funds, as did
thirty-five Arizona state house members and seven Arizona state senate members (in total, 47% of the legislature).1 8 1 In 2006, these numbers remained relatively stable, with publicly funded candidates

170

supra note 87, at 17.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-952.

171
172
173
174
175
176
177

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

178

See CLEAN ELECTIONS INST., THE ROAD TO VICTORY: CLEAN ELECTIONS SHAPES 2002

BRESLOW ET AL.,

169

id. §
id. §
id. §
id. §
id. §
id. §
id. §

16-952(E).
16-954(A).
16-946(A).
16-942(D)-(E).
16-954(B).
16-954(C).
16-944.

ARIZONA ELECTIONS 5 (2002), http://www.azclean.org/documents/2002RoadtoVictory-Fi-

nal.pdf.
179
ZONA

See SUE

O'CONNELL, INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS, CLEAN ELECTIONS: THE ARI-

EXPERIENCE 2 (2003), http://www.followthemoney.org/press/ReportView.phtml?r=

95.
180
181

See CLEAN ELECTIONS INST., supra note 178.
See CLEAN ELECTIONS INST., 2004 ELECTION STATISTICS (2005), http://azclean.org/

documents/2004GenElectionStatistics.pdf.
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winning nine out of eleven statewide offices (again, including the governor), twenty-nine Arizona state house seats, and nine Arizona state
18 2
senate seats (in total, 42% of the legislature).
Additionally, as in Maine, participating candidates and subsequently elected officials in Arizona praised the program's success on
several fronts. Some candidates felt that Arizona's public funding system "'expands opportunities and enhances democracy."' 183 The system also encouraged some candidates who would not have otherwise
run for office, particularly women, 18 4 to run.18 5 Lastly, as was the case
in Maine, participating candidates in Arizona reported being able to
spend more time with voters and less time fundraising.18 6 On this
same point, Leah Landrum, a Democrat and the Arizona House Minority Whip, called the public funding program "successful" and "a
good opportunity for individuals to get out there, talk to more of their
constituents, [and] do more of an effort to reach more
individuals . .".,187

182

See

CLEAN ELECTIONS INST., 2006 ELECTION STATISTICS

(2006), http://azclean.org/

documents/2006ElectionStatistics_000.pdf.
183

BRESLOW ET AL., supra note 87, at 33 (quoting Marc Spitzer, an Arizona Republican

who won election as Corporation Commissioner in 2000 using public funds). As Spitzer
recounted,
I am not a novice campaigner, having run for office successfully four times
under traditional private financing and in 2000 under Arizona's Clean Elections law. The comparison is stark. Clean Elections empowers the constituency, gives voices to thousands of voters, expands opportunities and
enhances democracy. Clean Elections is about bringing back grassroots,
one-to-one politics, the way it used to be, instead of high-dollar media campaigns financed by huge contributions from the well-heeled. Clean Elections is about the restoration of democracy.
Id.
184 Id. (stating that of the women who accepted public funding in 2000, 87% said they
would not have run without the public funding option). Another representative, Leah
Landrum Taylor, said, "Anytime I have an opportunity to speak to a group of women, I
encourage them to run for office, and tell them that it is possible using Clean Elections."
Northeast Action, Money & Politics: Electoral Reform and the Crisis of American Democracy, http://www.neaction.org/issuemoney.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2007) (quotation
omitted).
185
See, e.g., BRESLOW ET AL., supra note 87, at 24 (citing Meg Burton, an Arizona House
of Representatives candidate in 2000, who used public funds). As Burton recounted,
"'Without the Clean Elections option, I would not have run for office and subsequently
defeated a powerful incumbent and the future Speaker of the House.'" Id.
186
See, e.g., id. at 8 (citing David Peterson, an Arizona Republican incumbent). As
Peterson recounted,
The previous campaigns, I would say at least a half or a third of the campaign time was spent raising the dollars. In this campaign, the time I spent
raising the dollars was actually in front of my constituents, because as I went
door to door .. it gave me the opportunity to work more with my constituents and let them see me and talk to me about some of the issues....
Id.
187

Id. at 26.
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Recently, however, participating candidates expressed concern
that the system's public fund disbursements were too low and that the
contribution limits were too restrictive. 8 8 In order to address this
problem, several state representatives introduced House Bill 2690,
which, among other things, increases public fund disbursements
across the board and raises contribution limits.'8 9 The state house
passed House Bill 2690 unanimously, 190 and as this Note goes to
press, the bill was pending before the state senate. 19 1
3.

Notable Legal Challenges to the Arizona System

As in Maine, a multitude of individuals and organizations challenged the Arizona public funding system in court.
a.

Citizens Clean Elections Commission v. Myers

Citizens Clean Elections Commission v. Myers1 92 was one of the first
legal challenges to the CCEA and was unique in that it challenged
CCEA not on federal grounds but under the Arizona state constitution. In Myers, the plaintiffs challenged the appointment and removal
procedures for members of the Citizens Clean Elections Commission
(CCEC).193 In the original CCEA, statewide officials were responsible
for appointing members of CCEC members from a list of nominees
assembled by the state's Commission on Appellate Court Appointments, which is the body responsible for screening and nominating
individuals for appellate judgeships. 19 4 The chief justice of the Arizona Supreme Court serves as chair of the Commission on Appellate
Court Appointments. 95 The original CCEA vested power in the governor to remove individuals from the CCEC but only with the consent
of the Arizona Senate. 196 The plaintiffs challenged this appointment
97
and removal process as a violation of the Arizona constitution. 1
The local superior court first heard the case and held that the
Arizona constitution permitted the involvement of the Arizona Supreme Court with the Commission on Appellate Court Appointments
188 See, e.g., Matthew Benson, Clean Elections Bill Unanimously Passes in House, ARIZ. REP.,
Mar. 7, 2007, Valley & State, at 1.
189
See H.R. 2690, 48th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ariz. 2007).
190 See Arizona State Legislature, House Bill 2690: Bill Status Overview, http://www
.azleg.gov/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=Legtext/48eg/lr/bills/hb2690o.asp
Apr. 5, 2007).
191 See id.
192 1 P.3d 706 (Ariz. 2000).
193

See id. at 708.

194

See id. at 708-09.

195
196
197

See id.
See id. at 708.
See id.

(last visited
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in selecting members of the CCEC. 198 However, the court held that
the state senate's involvement in removing members from the CCEC
violated the separation of powers doctrine, and that the power of the
Commission on Appellate Court Appointments to nominate candidates for the CCEC violated the Arizona constitution.' 99 Although the
20 0
removal provision was severable, the nomination provision was not.
20 1
Consequently, the entire CCEA was invalid.
Upon a request for expedited review by the CCEC and Arizonans
for Clean Elections, which was the committee that had initially promoted the Clean Elections ballot measure, 20 2 the Supreme Court of
Arizona exercised special jurisdiction and directly heard the appeal. 20 3 On appeal, the court first held that expanding the duties of
the Commission on Appellate Court Appointments to include nominating members of the CCEC was unconstitutional because the nomi20 4
nating function was "wholly alien to its constitutional charter."
However, the court deemed this provision severable because it was not
essential for the CCEA to function, 20 5 and such a conclusion com20 6
ported with the CCEA's severability clause.
Second, the court reversed the court below and held that requiring the state senate's concurrence in removing members of the CCEC
did not violate the separation of powers doctrine. 20 7 The court explained that "[t]he power being exercised, concurrence, unlike removal, is not an executive power. The degree of control is minimal.
The purpose is cooperative. There has, as yet, been no

consequence. "208
Third, because the court found the Commission on Appellate
Court Appointments' involvement in the CCEC unconstitutional, the
court did not need to address the plaintiffs' argument that the involvement of the chief justice of the Arizona Supreme Court with the
198
199
200
201

See id. at 709.
See id.
See id.

See id.

202
203

See id.
See id. at 708.

204
205
206

Id. at 712.
See id. at 712-13.
CCEA's severability provision provides:

If a provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance
held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications
of the act that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable in any court
challenge to the validity of this article. The commission and Arizonans for
clean elections shall have standing to intervene.
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-960 (2006).
207 See Myers, 1 P.3d at 714.
208

Id.
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Commission on Appellate Court Appointments itself violated the sep20 9
aration of powers doctrine.
Finally, the court held that the Arizona Supreme Court's involvement in the appointment process for the CCEC was unconstitutional
and based its holding on three considerations.2 19 1 First, the power to
appoint was a power of the executive, not the judiciary. 2 1' Second,
the CCEC performed "functions wholly unrelated to the judicial
power vested" in the Supreme Court of Arizona.2 1 2 Third, the court
noted that "whether a particular member of this court makes an appointment is a direct function of that member's political party affiliation, which is directly contrary [to the requirement in the Arizona
constitution] that the members of this court do not sit as Republicans,
Democrats or anything else in their capacity asjustices." 21 3 However,
since this amounted to "a small and insignificant part of the Act," the
provision was severable. 2 14 Accordingly, the court severed the unconstitutional provisions, and the vast majority of the CCEA survived
intact.
b.

Lavis v. Bayless

In Lavis v. Bayless,2 15 which could be considered Arizona's counterpart to Maine's NationalRight to Life,2 16 two registered lobbyists subject to the CCEA's fee requirements and two individuals who received
traffic fines and were thus subject to the CCEA's 10% surcharge on
criminal and civil fines filed suit in federal court asserting that the
CCEA violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by compelling
citizens to make political contributions.2 17 The plaintiffs sued the Arizona secretary of state, who is the official charged with collecting the
lobbyist fees, and the state treasurer, who is the CCEA's principal administrator. 21 8 The CCEC and Arizonans for Clean Elections also intervened as defendants. 2 19 The CCEC moved to dismiss on the
ground that the TIA22 0 precludes subject matter jurisdiction because
the complaint involves a state tax. 22 1 The court noted that because
209
210
21 1
212
213
214

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

215 233 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Ariz. 2001).
216 Both cases involve lobbyist challenges to provisions of the public funding statutes
that levy fees on lobbyists to help finance the public funding systems.
217 See Lavis, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 1218.
218

See id.

219

See id.
28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
See Lavis, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 1218.

220
221
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the TIA aims to restrict the federal courts from interfering with how
states collect their revenue, 222 "[t]he TIA has its roots in fundamental
223
principles of federalism."
The first question confronting the court was whether the lobbyist
fees and the 10% civil and criminal fine surcharges constituted a tax
or a fee. 2 24 In deciding the issue, three factors guided the court's determination: "(1) the entity which imposes the tax; (2) the parties
upon whom the assessment is imposed; and (3) whether the assessment is expended for general public purposes, or used for the regulation or benefit of the parties upon whom the tax is imposed." 225 The
court noted that whether the imposing body calls an assessment a tax
226
or a fee is irrelevant.
The court began by examining the first factor, the entity that imposed the tax, and emphasized that a citizen initiative imposed the
tax. 2 27 The court noted that citizen initiatives "have the same force
and effect as acts passed by the [1]egislature," and that because an
assessment imposed by a legislature is more likely to be a tax than an
assessment imposed by a government agency, the first factor "weighs
228
in favor of finding that these assessments are a tax."
With respect to the second factor, the parties upon whom the
assessment is imposed, the court noted that the broader the class of
parties burdened, the more likely the assessment is a tax. 229 The court
observed, however, that in certain situations, even an assessment
against a narrower class of parties could still constitute a tax. 23 0 In the
case at hand, the court found that the fine surcharges applied to a
broad class of parties, which weighed in favor of finding the assessment to be a tax. 2 31 On the other hand, the court recognized that the
lobbyist assessments appeared to be imposed on a narrower class of
parties, which weighed in favor of finding that the assessment was a
23
fee and therefore not precluded by the TIA. 2
With respect to the third factor, the ultimate use of the assessment, the court noted that an assessment "treated as general reve222 See id. at 1219. The TIA provides that "district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or
restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy
and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000); see
also supra note 149 (discussing the TIA and its origin).
223 Lavis, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 1219.
224 See id.
225

Id. at 1220.

226
227

See id.
See id.

228

Id.

229
230
231
232

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id. at 1220-21.
id. at 1221.
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nue[ ] and paid into the state's general fund [is a] tax[ ]," and that
"[a]n assessment placed in a special fund and used for a special purpose is less likely to be [a] tax."23

3

However, "even assessments that

are segregated from general revenues are 'taxes' under the TIA if expended to provide a general benefit to the public.

234

Here, the state deposited assessments into a separate fund established by the CCEA for the special purpose of providing public monies to political campaigns, thus making the assessments less likely to be
taxes.2 35 However, the CCEA limited the use of the assessments by
requiring that only up to 10% may be spent on voter education and
only up to 10% may be spent on administrative and enforcement
costs. 23 6 Additionally, under the CCEA, any excess funds must be re23 7
turned to the state's general fund.

The court also determined that the assessments, through their
use in the public funding program, provided a general benefit to the
public. 238 This benefit took the form of the mission of the CCEA: to
"improve the integrity of Arizona government by reducing the influence of special interest money," to "encourage citizen participation in
the political process," and to "promote freedom of speech under the
U.S. and Arizona Constitutions."2 39 In addition, the court pointed to
the eight specific problems enumerated in the statute that the CCEA
sought to alleviate, including the high cost of running for office and
the resultant disincentive to participate, the excessive time spent fundraising, and the "cost to taxpayers as a result of subsidies and special
privileges given to campaign contributors." 240 Furthermore, the court
expressly referenced Buckley's holding that "public funding of political
campaigns furthers an important and significant government interest"24 1 and noted that "[t]here is no serious question about the legitimacy of the government interests in regulating the financing of
campaigns to prevent corruption and the appearance of
' 24 2

corruption."

In evaluating the third factor, the court concluded that the assessments contributed to the welfare of Arizona citizens and served an
important public purpose. 243 Furthermore, even though the funds
were segregated and earmarked for a special purpose, they either ben233

Id.

234

Id.

235

See id.

236

See id. (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-949(B), (C) (2006)).

237

See id. (citing id, § 16-954(D)).
See id. at 1221-22.
See id. (quoting Ajuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-940(A) (2006)).
Id. at 1222 (citing id. § 16-940(B)).
Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam)).
Id. (citing Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000)).
See id.

238

239
240
241
242
243
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efited the public generally or were returned to Arizona's general
2
fund. 44

After considering all three factors, the court concluded that the
10% surcharge on criminal and civil fines qualified as a tax for purposes of the TIA. 245 The lobbyist charges, although imposed on a narrower class, also constituted a tax because the purpose of the charges
was to raise revenue for the benefit of the public. 24 6 Additionally, the
court held that it "must broadly construe the TIA to prevent even indirect interference with a state's revenue flow. '24 7 Therefore, because
both charges qualified as taxes, the district court acknowledged that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide the. dispute and granted
248
the defendants' motion to dismiss.
c.

May v. McNally

May v. McNally represents one of the most important legal challenges to the CCEA. 249 In 2001, Steve May, then an Arizona state legislator, received a $27 parking ticket and a CCEA-mandated 10%
surcharge of $2.70.25o May refused to pay the $2.70 surcharge, asserting that paying the mandatory surcharge would violate his free speech
rights because the state could use the surcharge to provide public
funds to a candidate whose views he did not support. 25 1 This claim
was particularly threatening to the CCEA's viability because the 10%
surcharges on civil and criminal fines generated about two-thirds of
the Arizona system's funding. 252 May also challenged the fees imposed on registered lobbyists.

253

May filed suit in federal court, but the court dismissed the suit for
lack of subject matterjurisdiction based on the TIA. 254 May then filed
suit in Arizona state court and challenged the constitutionality of the
CCEA. 255 Arizonans for Clean Elections intervened, along with the

CCEC, arguing for CCEA's constitutionality. 256 The trial court held
244
245
246

See id.
See id.
See id.

247
248
249
250

Id.

See id. at 1222-23.
55 P.3d 768 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 923 (2003).
See id. at 770.
251
See id.
252
See Brennan Center for Justice, May v. Brewer Campaign Finance Reform, http://
www.brennancenter.org/stack detail.asp?key=102&subkey=7115 (last visited Feb. 16, 2007)
("Arizona adopted its Clean Elections system by initiative in 1998, receiving about twothirds of the system's funding from a surcharge on civil and criminal fines.").
253
See May, 55 P.3d at 770.
254
See Lavis v. Bayless, No. CIV 99-1627 (D. Ariz. Mar. 13, 2001).
255 See Lavis v. Bayless, No. CV 2001-006078, slip op. (Maricopa County Super. Ct. Dec.
21, 2001).
256 See id.
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that the civil and criminal surcharges were constitutional but held that
the lobbyist fees were unconstitutional. 25 7 The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the surcharges were unconstitutional. 25
Following the court of appeals decision, the Arizona Supreme
Court granted review. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals and upheld the surcharge's constitutionality. 259 The court
began by noting that Buckley supports the "proposition that public financing of political candidates, in and of itself, does not violate the
First Amendment, even though the funding may be used to further
260
speech to which the contributor objects."
However, May argued that three post-Buckley cases-Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,26 1 Keller v. State Bar of California,26 2 and United
States v. United Foods, Inc. 26 3-held

otherwise. 264

The Arizona Su-

preme Court distinguished the three post-Buckley cases on several
grounds. First, the court noted that "[t]he opportunity to commit a
crime or park illegally is not deserving of the same protection as is the
opportunity to participate in a lawful activity," such as teaching in
Abood or the practice of law in Keller 2 6 5 Second, Abood, Keller, and

United Foods each involved an association, which was not the case in
the instant controversy. 266 The court noted that "[a] t best, the group
[of surcharge payers] consists of tens of thousands of otherwise unrelated individuals who, at one time or another, paid a civil or criminal
fine." 26 7 Third, the speech in Abood, Keller, and United Foods was "view-

point driven," whereas the CCEA "allocates money to all qualifying
candidates, regardless of party, position, or message[,] . . .and thus
257
See id. The appellants did not appeal the trial court's finding that the lobbyist fee
was unconstitutional.
258
See May v. McNally, 49 P.3d 285 (Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002).
259
See May v. McNally, 55 P.3d 768, 774 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc).
260 Id. at 771.
261
431 U.S. 209, 235-236 (1977) (holding that although "unions could spend union
dues to support political candidates and causes," the unions "could use only such expenditures ... from charges, dues or assessments paid by employees who [did] not object to
advancing those ideas .... ).
262
496 U.S. 1, 13 (1990) (establishing the "germane" test and holding that "an organization such as a bar association, in which membership is a condition of employment, may
use funds generated from mandatory membership fees for activities 'germane' to the organization, but that it could not use those funds to advocate or support ideological viewpoints not 'germane' to the purpose for which compelled association was justified"
(quotation omitted)).
263
533 U.S. 405 (2001) (holding that fees imposed on mushroom handlers that were
used to pay for advertisements promoting mushroom sales were not "germane to a larger
regulatory purpose of the association" and therefore unconstitutionally violated the mushroom handlers' free speech rights).
264
See May, 55 P.3d at 771.
265
Id.
266
See id. at 771-72.
267
Id. at 772.
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the surcharge payers are not linked to any specific message, position
268
or viewpoint."
After finding that Abood, Keller, and United Foods did not provide
the appropriate context for evaluating the CCEA, 2 69 the court considered the United States Supreme Court's approach in Board of Regents
v. Southworth.2 70 In Southworth, a state university collected a mandatory
student-activity fee from students and allocated the fee on a viewpointneutral basis to student organizations, including various political and
ideological organizations.2 7 1 A group of students filed suit, asserting
that the university violated their free speech rights by funding organizations with whose viewpoints the students disagreed. 2 72 The Court
held that the university's viewpoint-neutral mode of allocation ade2 73
quately protected the students' free speech rights.
The May court noted that, similar to the university in Southworth,
the CCEA sought to facilitate free speech. 2 74 Additionally, like the
university, the CCEA distributed public funds on a viewpoint-neutral
basis. 275 Therefore, because Buckley permitted the use of public funds
to finance political campaigns, and because Southworth held that a
viewpoint-neutral mode of distribution sufficiently protects free
speech rights, the CCEA's surcharge on criminal and civil fines to fi276
nance the public funding system was constitutional.
May argued that the mode of distribution was not viewpoint-neutral because the surcharge payers must support the view that public
financing is good public policy and because not all candidates participate in the public funding system. 27 7 The court rejected these arguments, however, noting first that "'every appropriation made by
[government] uses public money in a manner to which some taxpayers object,"' 278 and that "government could not function if taxpayers
could refuse to pay taxes if they disagreed with the government policy
or function that the tax supported." 279 With respect to the candidateparticipation argument, the court reasoned that Southworth focused on
the "method of allocating funds, not the resulting viewpoints being
supported," and that in the case at hand, "[t] he method of allocation
funds under the Clean Elections Act [was] clearly neutral with regard
268
269

Id.

276
277
278

See id.
529 U.S. 217 (2000).
See id. at 222-26.
See id. at 226-27.
See id. at 230.
See 55 P.3d at 772-73.
See id. at 773.
See id.
See id.
Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92 (1976)).

279

Id.

270
271
272
273
274
275
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to the ideology or message of any candidate, and thus passe [d] muster
2 80
under Southworth."
Lastly, the court rejected an argument advanced in an amicus
brief that the surcharge was a fee, not a tax, and therefore must be
evaluated under a different analysis altogether. 28 ' The court held that
"whether the surcharge is a tax or a fee is not dispositive of the issues
in this case" because "[g]overnment may no more violate the First

28 2
Amendment by imposing a tax than it may by imposing a fee."

However, the court did address the issue of whether the surcharge was
a tax or a fee and concluded that the surcharge did, in fact, constitute
a tax, noting that "[i]t was imposed by a citizen initiative on a broad
range of payers for a public purpose." 28 3 May argued that the tax was
unconstitutional because the CCEA did not impose the tax on the
entire population of the state, thus burdening the "First Amendment
rights of a narrowly defined group of taxpayers." 28 4 The court rejected this argument, holding that the tax applied to the whole state
because "any person found to have parked illegally or committed a
crime will face the surcharge." 28 5 Therefore, "[n]o narrow, discrete
group of taxpayers are before us, nor are the fine payers exercising a
First Amendment right. ' 28 6 The court, therefore, held the tax
28 7
constitutional.
The Supreme Court denied May's petition for writ of certiorari in
March 2003.28
d.

Association of American Physicians & Surgeons v. Brewer

Association of American Physicians & Surgeons v. Brewer presented
the most recent challenge to CCEA. 28 9 The plaintiffs were a former

Republican gubernatorial candidate who ran in 2002 with private
funds, two individuals who planned to run for office using private
funds in upcoming elections, and a physicians' association that made
independent expenditures on behalf of political candidates. 29 0 They
collectively filed suit in the United States District Court for the District
of Arizona, asserting that parts of the CCEA violated their free speech
and equal protection rights under the First and Fourteenth Amend280

Id.

281

See id.

282

Id.

283

Id. at 774.

284
285
286

Id.
Id.

287
288
289
290

Id.
See id.
See May v. Brewer, 538 U.S. 923 (2003).
363 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Ariz. 2005).
See id. at 1198.
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ments. 29 t First, they claimed that the matching fund mechanism of
the CCEA "neutralize[d] the expender's voice when it ma[de] an independent expenditure" and "create [d] a chilling effect on the Association's free exercise of protected speech." 29 2 Second, they claimed
that the CCEA violated the First Amendment by "attempting to equalize the relative financial resources of the candidates, and coercing involuntary participation in public campaign financing by punishing
those candidates" who chose not to accept public funds. 293 Third,
they claimed that the CCEA regulated "much differently" each of the
varied categories of independent expenditures in the CCEA 294 in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 2 95 Fourth, they claimed that
the CCEA violated the Equal Protection Clause by treating participat296
ing and nonparticipating candidates differently.
The Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest and the Brennan Center for Justice of the New York University Law School intervened to defend the statute and filed a motion to dismiss. 297 The
district court addressed the complaint and the motion to dismiss by
relying on the reasoning of the Daggett court.298 Although there were
certain differences between the MCEA in Daggett and the CCEA in
American Physicians,those differences were not dispositive. 2 99 The district court explicitly adopted the First Circuit's reasoning in Daggett,
held all of the challenged provisions to be constitutional, and granted
30 0
the intervenors' motion to dismiss.
The plaintiffs appealed soon after. The Ninth Circuit heard oral
arguments for the case on February 12, 2007.301 As this Note goes to
press, a decision is pending.
e.

Lessons from the Arizona Cases

Several lessons may be drawn from the various challenges
mounted to the CCEA. First, as the holding in Citizens Clean Elections
291

See id.
Id.
293 Id. at 1198-99.
294
These categories are: "(1) those statements brought forward to the voting populace
against a participating candidate or in favor of the nonparticipating opponent of a participating candidate; (2) those statements that favor a participating candidate; and (3) those
statements that oppose a nonparticipating candidate." Id. at 1199.
295 See id.
296 See id.
297 See id. at 1198.
298 See id. at 1200-03. For a complete discussion of Daggett, see supra Part II.A.3.a.
299 See Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 1200.
300
See id. at 1202-03.
301
See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Location of Hearing for February
Calendar (Revised Notice), http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/calendar.nsf/818e02aldeab
7b7b882567770063a742/ecebd08al2fe9723882572530004e133?OpenDocument
(last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
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Commission v. Myers suggests, the executive should appoint, or, alternatively, the populace should elect the members of a commission that
administers a full public funding system to avoid separation of powers
concerns. Similarly, the removal of commission members should be
the responsibility of the executive branch. Legislative involvement
should be limited to the consent of the state senate, at most.
Second, pursuant to Lavis v. Bayless, in order to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts concerning matters including mandatory
lobbyist charges, mandatory surcharges on criminal and civil fines, or
any other similar assessments levied to fund a public financing system,
the imposing body should be the legislature or the citizenry and not
an administrative agency. Additionally, the assessment should affect
as broad a class of parties as possible so that the assessment is more
like a tax and less like a discriminatory fee. Furthermore, the relevant
statute should allocate as large a portion of the funds as possible directly to the main purpose of the public funding program, funding
campaigns, and not to administrative or enforcement costs. The statute should explicitly state how the program benefits the public. In
Lavis v. Bayless, for example, the CCEA's explicit enumeration of its
goals along with a list of specific problems the statute was trying to
alleviate substantially aided the court in determining the benefit to
the public.
Third, May v. McNally demonstrates the importance of an explicit
requirement in the public funding program's statute that public funds
are to be allocated using a viewpoint-neutral mechanism. This type of
mechanism is critical to shielding the public funding programs from
First Amendment attacks when individuals claim that the public funds
are being distributed to candidates with whose views the individuals
disagree.
Fourth, in litigation, supporters of full public funding programs
should rely heavily on the First Circuit's Daggett opinion, the importance of which was bolstered significantly by the Arizona district
30 2
court's highly deferential opinion in American Physicians.
C.

North Carolina
1.

North CarolinaJudicial Campaign Reform Act

In 2002, the North Carolina state legislature passed the North
Carolina Judicial Campaign Reform Act, 30 3 and Governor Mike Easley
302
This recommendation may be strengthened or weakened depending on how the
Ninth Circuit rules in American Physicians.
303
2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 158 (codified as amended in scattered sections of N.C. GEN.
STAT. ch. 163 (2005)).
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signed the bill into law. 30 4 The statute creates a voluntary full public

funding program for judicial candidates running for the state's court
of appeals and supreme court and lowers contribution limits for nonparticipating candidates. 30 5 The statute has been in effect since the
30 6
2004 elections.
Judicial candidates must voluntarily meet several conditions to be
eligible for public funding. First, candidates must agree not to raise
or spend more than $10,000 of private funds on their campaigns during the year preceding the election year. 30 7 Second, after declaring
their intent to participate, candidates must collect at least 350 qualifying contributions in amounts between $10 and $500 from North Carolina registered voters during a specified qualifying period.3 08 In
addition, the aggregate sum of the qualifying contributions must be
between a minimum of thirty times the candidate filing fee for the
office and a maximum of sixty times the candidate filing fee for the
office. 30 9 Third, during the qualifying period, the candidate may only
contribute up to $1,000 to his or her campaign, and family members
of the candidate-spouse, parent, child, brother, or sister-may also
only contribute up to $1,000 each. 3 10 Fourth, during the qualifying
period, a candidate may only spend the qualifying contributions, any
remaining private funds, any remaining personal or family funds, and
any potential matching funds. 3 1" Fourth, after the qualifying period,
the candidate must limit his or her spending to the public fund disbursement, any funds remaining from the qualifying period, and any
31 2
potential matching funds.
The following chart indicates the minimum and maximum
amounts of qualifying contributions, in addition to the initial public
funds distribution, for each level of judicial office.

304 See, e.g., Doug Bend, Current Development, North Carolina'sPublic FinancingofJudicial Campaigns:A PreliminaryAnalysis, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 597, 602 (2005).
305 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.64 (2005).
306
See id. § 163-278.61. For a general discussion on public financing in the judicial
context including reference to North Carolina's reforms, see Phyllis Williams Kotey, Public
Financingfor Non-PartisanJudicial Campaigns: ProtectingJudicial Independence While Ensuring
Judicial Impartiality, 38 AKRON L. REv. 597 (2005).
307 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.64(d)(1) (2005). Therefore, the North Carolina program permits more private fundraising than the Maine and Arizona systems.
308
See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-278.62(15), 163-278.64(b).
309 See id. § 163-278.62(9), (10). For the current qualifying contribution aggregate
minimums and maximums, see infra Table 5.

310
311
312

See id. § 163-278.64(d) (4).
See id. §§ 163-278.64(d) (2), (4).
See id. § 163-278.64(d) (3).
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TABLE 5. NORTH CAROLINA JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN REFORM SYSTEM
Initial Public
Funds
Distribution
(175x filing fee)

Min. Amt. of

Max. Amt. of

Initial Public

Filing Fee
(1% of Salary)

Qualifying
Contributions
(30x filing fee)

Qualifying
Contributions
(60x filing fee)

Funds
Distribution
(125x filing fee)

Supreme Court

$1,150

$34,500

$69,000

-

$201,300

Court of Appeals

$1,110

$33,000

$66,000

$137,500

-

Office

Source:

DEMocRAcY NORTH CAROLINA, LEGISLATIVE SUMMARY - SENATE BILL 1054 2 (2006), availabe at http://

www.democracy-nc.org/nc/j udicialcampaignreform/udreformSB I054summ.pdf.

The North Carolina system also includes a matching fund mecha'3 13
In a contested primary, if a participating candidate runs against a nonparticipating candidate who
outspends him or her by about $67,000, then the participating candinism termed "rescue funds.

date is eligible for rescue funds of up to $135,000.314

In a general

election, if a participating candidate runs against a nonparticipating
candidate who outspends him or her by the amount of the initial public funds distribution for that office, then the participating candidate
31 5
is eligible for rescue funds of up to twice the initial distribution.
The same matching fund mechanism applies with the same triggers if
a participating candidate is the target of independent expenditure activity, which is spending in support of the nonparticipating candidate
3 16
or spending to attack the participating candidate.

The program was initially funded by a $3 check-off on the state
income tax form, 3 17 voluntary $50 contributions requested from attorneys at the time they pay their license tax, 3 18 unspent funds remaining

from past elections, 31 9 and voluntary contributions from businesses
and organizations. 320 In 2006, the $50 attorney contributions became

mandatory; 32 1 all other funding sources remained the same.
2.

North Carolina Results

Although North Carolina's system has only operated since 2004,
the early results are encouraging. 322 As Doug Bend noted in his review of the system, "Perhaps the most impressive success is simply the
323
number of judicial candidates who participated in the program."
313
314

Id. § 163-278.67.
See id. § 163-278.67(b).

315
316

See id.

323

Id.

See id.
317 See id. §§ 105-159.2, 163-278.63(b)(2).
318 See id. §§ 10541, 163-278.63(b) (3).
319 See id. § 163-278.63(b)(4)-(5).
320 See id. § 163-278.63(b) (6).
321
See An Act to Make Base Budget Appropriations for Current Operations of State
Departments, Institutions, and Agencies, and for Other Purposes, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 276
§ 23A.I(b) (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.63(b)(7) (2005)).
322
See, e.g.,
Bend, supra note 304, at 602.
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In 2004, twelve of the sixteen candidates for the court of appeals and
the supreme court qualified for the program. 3 24 An additional two
candidates sought to qualify but failed to obtain the required number
of qualifying contributions. 325 Four of the five winning candidates received public funding. 32 6 Additionally, in 2002, 73% ofjudicial candidates' nonfamily campaign money came from attorneys and other
private sources. 3 27 In 2004, this number dropped to 14% for partici32 8
pating candidates.
In 2006, eight of the twelve candidates for the court of appeals
and the supreme court qualified for the program. 329 An additional
candidate sought to qualify but failed to obtain the required number
of qualifying contributions.3 30 Five of the six winning candidates received public funding. 33 1 Furthermore, the first matching funds payment occurred in 2006. In the race for chief justice of the North
Carolina Supreme Court, nonparticipating candidate Rusty Duke
spent $54,595 more than the $216,650 public funding grant to participating candidate Sarah Parker. This triggered a rescue fund payment
332
of $54,595 to Parker, who proceeded to win the election.
3.

Notable Legal Challenge to the North CarolinaSystem
a. Jackson v. Leake

In 2005, two potential judicial candidates, North Carolina Right
to Life Committee Fund for Independent Political Expenditures, and
North Carolina Right to Life State Political Action Committee, filed
suit in federal court in North Carolina against state election officials,
asserting that North Carolina's judicial public funding program violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. 33 3 The
324
See Democracy North Carolina, Judicial Campaign Reform Successes, By the Numbers 1 (2004), http://www.democracy-nc.org/nc/judicialcampaignreform/JCRAsuccess
.pdf.
325 See id.
See id. Indeed, one of the winning candidates, Judge Wanda Bryant, praised the
326
system, stating that "[u]sing public funds, you're more aware of what you're doing, of
everything that you're spending and documenting it." Northeast Action, supra note 184.
Judge Bryant purported that the system "makes for cleaner elections." Id.
327 See Democracy North Carolina, A Profile of the Judicial Public Financing Program,
2004-06 3 (June 2006), http://www.democracy-nc.org/nc/judicialcampaignreform/impactO6-06.pdf.
328 See id.
329 See Democracy North Carolina, A Profile of the Judicial Public Financing Program,

2004-06 1 (Jan. 2007), http://www.democracy-nc.org/nc/judicialcampaignreform/over
viewjan07.pdf.
330 See id.
331
See id.
332 See id. at 2.
333 SeeJackson v. Leake, No. 1:05-CV-691, 2006 WL 2264027, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 7,
2006) (mem.). The plaintiffs originally filed suit in the Middle District of North Carolina.
See id. The defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit, and in August 2006, based on certain
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defendants filed a motion to dismiss as did the intervenor-defendants-Common Cause of North Carolina and James R. Ansley, a can334
didate in the 2004 North Carolina judicial elections.
The plaintiffs, among other things, moved for a preliminary injunction to halt operation of the program, 335 which the court denied
on October 26, 2006.336 First, the court held that one of the judicial
candidates lacked standing on all but one of the claims. 3 37 Second,

the court held that the Tax Injunction Act barred it from evaluating
3 38
any claims regarding the mandatory $50 attorney contributions.
On the one hand, several factors favored finding that the surcharge
was a fee: it only affected "a relatively discrete segment of societyactive members of the North Carolina State Bar"; the state placed the
339
surcharges into North Carolina Public Campaign Financing Fund;

and part of the fund "serve [d] to defray expenses associated with administering the Fund. '340 On the other hand, the fund also "ha[d]
aspects which benefit the public at large (e.g., campaign finance, the
Voter Guide [,] ...public education)," which favored finding that the

surcharge
dle of the
surcharge
of finding

was a tax. 34 1 Holding that "the surcharge falls in the midtax/fee spectrum," the court examined the purpose of the
and concluded that the purpose tilted the balance in favor
that the surcharge was a tax. 3 42 Therefore, the court lacked

3 43
jurisdiction over the issue.

The court then employed the "balance of hardships" test and
found that a preliminary injunction was not warranted based on the
jurisdictional issues, the court granted the motion in part, denied the motion in part, and
transferred the case to the Eastern District of North Carolina. See id. at *10.
334 See Motion to Dismiss,Jackson v. Leake, No. 1:05-CV-691 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 14, 2005);
Intervenors-Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Jackson v. Leake, No. 1:05-CV-691 (M.D.N.C.
Nov. 15, 2005).
335
See Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Jackson v. Leake, No. 1:05-CV691 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 16, 2005).
336 SeeJackson v. Leake, No. 5:06-CV-324-BR (E.D.N.C. Oct. 26, 2006) (denying preliminary injunction).
337 See id. at 5.
338 See id. at 9-10.
339
Id. at 8.
340

Id. at 9.

341

Id.

342 Id. The surcharge supported the fund, and as stated in the statute, the purpose of
the fund
is to ensure the fairness of democratic elections in North Carolina and to
protect the constitutional rights of voters and candidates from the detrimental effects of increasingly large amounts of money being raised and
spent to influence the outcome of elections, those effects being especially
problematic in elections of the judiciary, since impartiality is uniquely important to the integrity and credibility of the courts.
Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.61 (2005)).
343 See id. at 9-10.
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plaintiffs' remaining claims.3 44 The court first addressed the "Irreparable Harm to Plaintiffs/Likelihood of Success" factor. 345 The plaintiffs challenged the Act's reporting provision, which set forth
reporting requirements for nonparticipating candidates and entities
making independent expenditures. 346 The court noted that the governmental interests supporting the reporting provision were "sufficiently compelling" to satisfy the "exacting" level of scrutiny required
by Buckley. 3 47 Among other things, the reporting provision furthered
the purpose of the overall public funding system: "[T]o ensure fair
judicial elections and protect the constitutional rights of voters and
candidates from the detrimental effects of increasingly large amounts
of money being raised and spent to influence the outcome of such
elections.

'3

48

More specifically, the provision also "enable[d] the

[North Carolina Board of Elections] to gather data to effectively implement the trigger and rescue funds provisions of the Fund."3

49

Ad-

3 50

ditionally, voters could access the reported information.
The plaintiffs also argued that the reporting provision improperly
burdened nonparticipating candidates because it "effectively required
[nonparticipating candidates] to disclose [their] campaign strategy"
and required "extensive time . . .to comply[ ] with the reporting requirements.

3

51

The court disagreed. First, the Act also imposed re-

porting requirements on participating candidates, and "[e]ven if [one
of the defendants] is required to report more than his participating
opponent, that burden does not make the provision unconstitutional
per se.1 3 5 2 Second, "[t] he reporting provision does not come into play
for . . .nonparticipating candidates until 80% of trigger for rescue

funds is reached," and "[t]hereafter, reporting is required after each
additional amount exceeding $1000.

''

3

53

According to the court,

"[t]hese requirements [were] not unduly burdensome," and the
'
$1,000 threshold was not "wholly without rationality.

354

The court then held that the provision enabled the Board of
Elections to "determine when it may issue rescue funds.

'355

In turn,

344 Id. at 10 (quoting Krichbaum v. U.S. Forest Serv., 991 F. Supp. 501, 502-03 (W.D.
Va. 1998)); see id. at 11-23.
345 Id. at 11.
346

See id. at 12.

347

Id. at 13-14.

348

Id. at 14 (quotations omitted).

349
350
351

Id.
See id.

Id. at 14-15 (citation omitted).
Id. at 15 (citing Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 2d
1197, 1201-03 (D. Ariz. 2005)).
352

353

Id.

354

Id. at 15-16 (citations omitted).

355

Id. at 16.
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"It]he rescue funds, i.e., public financing, promote the State's anticorruption interest," and "[d]isclosure promotes a fully informed
electorate. ' 35 6 The court concluded, "Thus, there is a 'substantial relation' between those interests and the information ... nonparticipat357
ing candidates must disclose."

The court also rejected plaintiffs' arguments that the statute's
"obligations" reporting requirement and its twenty-four hour reporting requirement were overbroad, concluding, "In the court's opinion,
the statute is narrowly drawn to further North Carolina's compelling
interests.

'358

The plaintiffs also challenged the "21 day provision" in the Act as
an "unconstitutional time limitation on contributions.

'35 9

The "provi-

sion prohibits a candidate from accepting, or a contributor from making, a contribution during the 21 days before the general election
until the day after that election under certain circumstances." 360 The
court held, however, that "[i]t is significant to note that the statute
does not operate as an outright ban on all contributions during the
defined period" because it "specifically exclude [d] contributions and
loans from a candidate or his or her spouse," and "the only contributions prohibited during the short time before the general election are
those that 'cause[ ] the candidate to exceed the "trigger for rescue
funds" . . . .'[I] where an opposing participating candidate has not

36
received the maximum rescue funds available." '
In upholding the twenty-one day provision, the court first held
that North Carolina had a sufficiently compelling interest in preventing corruption to justify the restrictions in the provision. 36 2 Second,
the provision was not overly broad, because it "does not bar all contributions, applies only to appellate court candidates,... is for a limited
time," and "is necessary to properly effectuate the trigger for rescue

funds. ' 363

Therefore, "[i]t appears the provision i[s] narrowly tai-

3 64
lored to advance North Carolina's interest."
The plaintiffs also attacked the rescue funds provision of the Act,
asserting that "because a nonparticipating candidate's own contributions and expenditures count towards the trigger for a participating
356

Id.

357

Id.

Id. at 16-18.
Id. at 18.
360 Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.13(e2) (3) (2005)).
361 Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.13(e2) (3)).
362 See id. at 18-19.
363 Id. at 20 ("Without the provision, if rescue funds are triggered by a contribution to
a nonparticipating candidate shortly before the election, the Board may not have sufficient
time to issue the funds to a participating candidate." (quoting Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d
940, 949-50 (6th Cir. 1998))).
358

359

364

Id.
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(opposing) candidate's receipt of rescue funds, nonparticipating candidates are effectively penalized for contributions to and expenditures
for their own campaigns which Buckley prohibits."3 6 5 Although there
were no direct restrictions on nonparticipating candidate expenditures, the plaintiffs argued that "the indirect restriction . . . violates

the constitution," and because independent expenditures can trigger
rescue funds, this chills the First Amendment rights of entities making
these expenditures because this "may result in making more money
available to an opposing participating candidate.

'3 66

Lastly, the plain-

tiffs argued "that the rescue funds provision operates as content-based
discrimination and impedes the ability of like-minded persons to pool
resources."367

Here, the court noted that "the First Circuit's rationale" in Daggett
was "persuasive"3 68 and adopted its reasoning. The court quoted a
large portion of text from the Daggett opinion, in which the court held
that the MCEA's "'provision of matching funds does not indirectly
burden donors' speech and associational rights.' "369
Lastly, the plaintiffs attacked the entire public financing system,
asserting "that the scheme places nonparticipating candidates at a distinct disadvantage relative to participating candidates, representing
invidious and unconstitutional discrimination. 3 70 The court flatly rejected this argument: "The court simply disagrees with plaintiffs' argument that the scheme's reporting provision, trigger, and 21 day
provision unfairly or unnecessarily burden nonparticipating candidates' political opportunities, .

.

. given the important interests ad-

37
vanced by the public financing scheme." '
Therefore, the plaintiffs "have not shown a likelihood of success
on the merits on any of their claims challenging [specific provisions of
the Act] and North Carolina's public financing system as a whole,"
and "[a] ccordingly, plaintiffs have not made a strong showing of irrep37 2
arable harm."

As a final consideration, the court held that the "Harm to Defendants/Public Interest" factor weighed in favor of not granting the
injunction. 373 The court held that granting the injunction "would
likely disrupt the electoral process for appellate judges" because
"[t]he general election [was] less than two weeks [a]way[,] . ...
365
366
367
368
369
370
371

Id.
Id.
Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 21.
Id. (quoting 205 F.3d 445, 464 (st Cir. 2000)).
Id. at 22.

372

Id.
Id. at 23.

373

Id.
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[e]ight of the twelve candidates in the general election are participating in the Fund," and [t]hese candidates have relied upon the
3 74

Fund."

The court concluded, "In balancing the [irreparable harm to
plaintiffs, likelihood of success, harm to defendants, and public inter3 75
est] factors, . . . a preliminary injunction is not warranted."
On March 20, 2007, the court granted defendants' and intervenor-defendants' motions to dismiss and entered judgment for the
defendants. 376 First, the court dismissed two of the defendants-the
state attorney general and the district attorney for Wake County-on
the ground that the plaintiffs failed to establish standing to sue these
two defendants. 377 Second, with respect to the remaining defendants,
"[f] or the reasons set forth in the order denying plaintiffs' motion for
3 78
a preliminary injunction," the plaintiffs failed to state a claim.
b.

Lessons from Jackson v. Leake

The court's opinion in Jackson affirms several important lessons
from the Maine and Arizona cases and also offers additional insight.
If a surcharge on lawyers or lobbyists must be used as a funding source
in order for it to qualify as a tax and avoid federal jurisdiction, proceeds from the surcharge should be used to benefit the public at large
as much as possible. Furthermore, the public financing statute should
explicitly identify why the surcharge is being collected and how it benefits the public. At the very least, because the surcharge typically supports the public funding system as a whole, the statute should
explicitly state the goals of the system and how the system benefits the
public.
In addition, any reporting provisions should be narrowly tailored
to advance identifiable and compelling governmental interests, including larger anticorruption goals, but also more program-specific
goals (e.g., to enable operation of matching fund triggers). If possible, it would also be helpful to explicitly state these interests in the
statute. Drafters of such reporting provisions also should be cognizant
of the burdens placed on nonparticipating candidates. Moreover, as
much as possible, any contribution limitation periods should be narrowly tailored with respect to coverage and time. Lastly, as was the
case in American Physicians, for supporters of public financing programs, Jackson strongly affirms the importance of the First Circuit's
374

Id.

375

Id.

376 SeeJackson v. Leake, No. 5:06-CV-324-BR (E.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2007) (granting motions to dismiss).
377 See id. at 2-5.
378 Id. at 6.
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Daggett decision, especially its reasoning with respect to matching fund
provisions.
D.

Connecticut
1.

Connecticut's Act Concerning Comprehensive Campaign Finance
Reform for State-Wide Constitutionaland General Assembly
Offices

On December 1, 2005, the Connecticut legislature approved Public Act No. 5, An Act Concerning Comprehensive Campaign Finance
Reform for State-Wide Constitutional and General Assembly Offices 3 7 9 and Governor M. Jodi Rell signed the bill into law six days
later.38 0 Public Act No. 5 included a sweeping set of reforms, including restrictions on campaign contributions and the establishment of a
voluntary full public funding system for candidates for the Connecticut state legislature, governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general,
3 8s
state comptroller, secretary of state, and state treasurer.
To be eligible for the public funding program, candidates must
declare their intent to participate and then collect a certain dollar
amount of qualifying contributions during a specified qualifying period. 38

2

Qualifying contributions must come from individuals and

may not exceed $100, including contributions from the candidate personally.3 83 Contributions from communicator lobbyists, state contrac38 4
tors, and prospective state contractors over $50 are prohibited.
Gubernatorial candidates must collect $250,000 of which $225,000
must come from Connecticut residents.3 8 5 Candidates for the offices
of lieutenant governor, attorney general, state comptroller, state treasurer, and secretary of state must collect $75,000, of which $67,500
must come from Connecticut residents. 38 6 State senate candidates
must collect $15,000, which must include contributions of at least $5
from a minimum of 300 individuals living in the applicable senate district. 38 7 State house candidates must collect $5,000, which must in-

clude contributions of at least $5 from a minimum of 150 individuals
38 8
living in the applicable house district.

379 See 2005 Conn. Pub. Acts 5 (Spec. Sess.) (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 9-333a to -333n, 9-700 to -751 (Supp. 2006)); Mark Pazniokas & Christopher Keating,
Legislature Passes Reform Package, HARTFORD CouANT, Dec. 1, 2005.
380 See Ken Dixon, Rell Signs Landmark Election Reform Bil4 CONNEcriCUT POST, Dec. 8,
2005, at A7.
381
See § 3 (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-702) (Supp. 2006)).
382 See § 9-702.
383 See id. § 9-704(a).
384 See id. § 9-704(b).
385 See id. § 9-704(a)(1).
386 See id. § 9-704(a)(2).
387 See id. § 9-704(a) (3).
388 See id. § 9-704(a) (4).
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The Connecticut statute has a special provision permitting participating candidates to contribute personal funds up to certain relatively low limits to their own campaigns: $20,000 for governor, $10,000
for the other statewide offices, $2,000 for state senate, and $1,000 for
state house. s8 9 These funds do not count, however, toward the qualifying contributions requirement. 390 Furthermore, any public fund
disbursements will be reduced by the amount of personal funds that a
39 1
candidate contributed to his own campaign.

During the time preceding the primary, a participating candidate
may only spend collected qualifying contributions in addition to any
personally contributed campaign funds. 392 After collecting the qualifying contributions, major-party candidates will receive the public
fund disbursements for the primary election based on the office
sought. 393 For the primary election, major-party candidates may only

spend the public funds, any remaining qualifying contributions, any
remaining personal funds, and any additional monies authorized
394
under the matching fund provisions of the statute.
If a candidate from any party prevails in the primary, he or she is
395
then eligible for a public funding grant for the general election.
The level of disbursements varies based on the office sought, party
affiliation, and whether the race is contested. 39 6 For the general election, a candidate may only spend the public funding grant for the
general election, any remaining funds from the public funding grant
for the primary, any remaining qualifying contributions, any remaining personal funds, and any additional monies authorized under the
397
matching fund provisions of the statute.
The scheduled election disbursements for contested races in
2008 and 2010 are as follows:

389
390
391
392

See id. § 9-710(c).
See id.
See id. § 9-705 0)(1).
See id. § 9-702(c).
393
See id. § 9-705. Minor- and petitioning-party candidates are not eligible for primary
grants. See id. § 9-705(c) (providing that minor- and petitioning-party candidates only receive funding for the general election).
394 See id. § 9-702 (c).
395
See id. §§ 9-705, -708.
396
See id. § 9-705(a),(b),(e), (f), (j) (2). See infra Table 6 for the amounts of the initial
public fund distributions. Candidates who run uncontested in the general election are
eligible for 30% of the contested general election disbursement. See id. § 9- 7 05(j) (3).
397
See id. § 9-702. Any remaining funds from the primary grant, however, will reduce
the general election grant by the total amount of the unexpended primary funds. See id.
§ 9-7050) (2).
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PUBLIC FUNDS DISTRIBUTIONS FOR CONTESTED
CONNECTICUT RACES

Major-Party Candidate

Office

Primary
Election

Governor

$1,250,000

Lieutenant Governor
Attorney General
State Comptroller
Secretary of State
State Treasurer

State Senate

General
Election

$3,000,000

Primary
Election

General
Election

-

One-third of
major-party
grant, if certain
conditions are
met

$375,000

$750,000

-

One-third of
major-party
grant, if certain
conditions are
met

$35,000, if
certain
conditions
Se n t cn

$85,000

-

One-third
major-partyof
grant, if certain
conditions are

are met

State House

$1,0,if
certain
conditions
are met

Petitioning-Party
Candidate

Minor-Party Candidate

Primary
Election

General
Election

-

One-third of
major-party
grant, if certain
conditions are
met

-

One-third of
major-party
grant, if certain
conditions are
met

-

of
One-third
major-party
grant, if certain
conditions are

met

$25,000

-

One-third of
major-party
grant, if certain
conditions are

met

-

One-third of
major-party
grant, if certain
conditions are

met

met

Source: An Act Concerning Comprehensive Campaign Finance Reform for State-Wide Constitutional and
General Assembly Offices, 2005 Conn. Pub. Acts 5, § 6 (Spec. Sess.) (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 9-333a to -333n, 9-700 to -751 (Supp. 2006)).

Like the Maine system, participating candidates are also eligible
for matching funds up to twice the initial public distribution if independent expenditures target them or if nonparticipating opponents
398
outspend them.

The program's funding sources differ from those in the Maine,
Arizona, and North Carolina public funding systems. The North Carolina statute requires that the State Treasurer deposit at least $16 million a year from state sales of escheats into the Citizen Election
Fund.3

99

If proceeds from escheat sales fail to reach $16 million in

any given year, the shortfall is made up using revenues from corporate
taxes.

40 0

The bill was updated on June 6, 2006, to close potential loopholes and to help protect the law from legal challenges. 40

1

In addi-

398 See id. § 9-713 (providing matching funds if a nonparticipating candidate opposed
by at least one participating candidate expends over 90% of the grant for participating
candidates), § 9-714 (providing matching funds for participating candidates targeted by
independent expenditures).

399 See id. § 3-69a (amended by An Act Concerning Comprehensive Campaign Finance
Reform for State-Wide Constitutional and General Assembly Offices, 2005 Conn. Pub. Acts
5, § 51 (Spec. Sess.)).
400 See id. § 9-750.
401
See An Act Concerning the Campaign Finance Reform Legislation and Certain
Election Law and Ethics Provisions, 2006 Conn. Pub. Acts 137 (codified at scattered sections of id. tit. 1, 9 (Supp. 2006)).
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tion, in the fall of 2006, the Connecticut State Elections Enforcement
Commission released two declaratory rulings: one clarifying the statute's prohibition on lobbyist contributions and solicitation, 40 2 and the
other clarifying the statute's impact on political committees established or controlled by lobbyists. 40 3 The commission hoped to clarify
the intent and operation of the statute in these two areas to provide
guidance to candidates and to help the courts evaluate legal chal40 4
lenges to the statute.
Public Act No. 5 became effective on January 1, 2006.405 Legisla-

tive candidates will be eligible for full public funding beginning with
the 2008 election cycle, and statewide candidates will be eligible in
2010.406

2.

Notable Legal Challenges to the Connecticut System
a.

Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield

On July 7, 2006, the Green Party of Connecticut along with the
American Civil Liberties Union of Connecticut and certain other
plaintiffs sued the executive director and general counsel of the state
Elections Enforcement Commission and the state attorney general (in
their official capacities) in federal court. The plaintiffs alleged that
Public Act No. 5 violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by
"effectively excluding participation by minor and petitioning party
'40 7
candidates through unduly burdensome eligibility requirements.
In addition, the plaintiffs attacked the validity of the statute's matching fund mechanism and its restrictions on lobbyists' campaign activities as a violation of the First Amendment's free speech rights. 40 8 As
402

See State Elections Enforcement Comm'n, Declaratory Ruling 2006-1, Lobbyist

Contribution and Solicitation Ban 2-5 (Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://www.ct.gov/
seec/lib/seec/DeclaratoryRuling_2006-lobbyist.pdf.
403
See State Elections Enforcement Comm'n, Declaratory Ruling 2006-2, Political
Committees Established or Controlled by Communicator Lobbyists 3 (Dec. 20, 2006),
available at http://www.ct.gov/seec/lib/seec/DecRuling_2006-2-FINAL.pdf.
404
See, e.g., Keith M. Phaneuf, Elections Panel Rulings to Bolster New Campaign Finance
Rules, JOURNAL INQUIRER (N.-Cent. Conn.), Oct. 4, 2006, available at http://www.journal
inquirer.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=17281180&BRD=985&PAG=461&deptid=161556&rfi
=6.
405
See An Act Concerning Comprehensive Campaign Finance Reform for State-Wide
Constitutional and General Assembly Offices, 2005 Conn. Pub. Acts 5, § 1 (Spec. Sess.)).
406
See id. § 3.
407
Complaint at 2, Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, No. 3:06-cv-01030 (D. Conn. July
6, 2006).
408
See id. at 3-4. For additional discussion of the suit, see Tobin A. Coleman, Lawsuit
Targets CampaignFinance, STAMFORD Avoc.,July 7, 2006, at A9; Ted Mann, Suit Claims State
Campaign Finance Law Unfair, THE DAY, July 7, 2006, at Al. For an argument against the
plaintiffs' position, see Editorial, Destroyinga Law to Save It, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006, at 13.
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this Note goes to press, the action is pending in the United States
40 9
District Court for the District of Connecticut.
b.

Lobbyist Challenges

On August 29, 2006, the Association of Connecticut Lobbyists
LLC and Barry Williams, an individual lobbyist, instituted their own
suit challenging Public Act No. 5 in the United States District Court
for the District Court of Connecticut. 41 0

The plaintiffs alleged that

the act's prohibitions on contributions by lobbyists and their spouses
as well as the statute's restrictions on how lobbyists can advise their
clients on contributions violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 411 On October 18, 2006, the court consolidated the suit
with Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield.4 12 The Brennan Center for
Justice of the New York University Law School and several former state
candidates (who plan to run again) moved to intervene in the consolidated cases to defend the statute, and the court granted their motion
on February 27, 2007.413 As this Note goes to press, the consolidated
action is still pending.
In the fall of 2006, several lobbyist groups also began the process
to institute suit against Public Act No. 5 in state court. Like the federal suit, the state suit will challenge the act's lobbyist contribution
limits and other lobbyist restrictions. 4 14 As this Note goes to press,
this action is also still pending.
c.

Securities Industry & FinancialMarkets Association v. Garfield

In December 2006, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association (SIFMA) filed the most recent challenge to Public Act No.
5 in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut,
alleging that some of the statute's provisions pertaining to state contractors violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal
Constitution. 4 15 Specifically, the suit asserted that the provision in the
statute requiring Connecticut to post the names of close relatives of
409
See Docket, Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, No. 3:06-CV-01030-SRU (D. Conn.)
(PACER).
410
See Complaint, Ass'n of Conn. Lobbyists LLC v. Garfield, No. 3:06-cv-1030 (D.
Conn. Aug. 29, 2006) (on file with author).
411
See id. at 5-14.
412
See Ass'n of Conn. Lobbyists LLC, No. 3:06-cv-1030 (D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2006) (ordering

consolidation).
413
See Ass'n of Conn. Lobbyists LLC, No. 3:06-cv-1030 (D. Conn. Feb. 27, 2007) (ruling
on motions to intervene).
414
See, e.g., Kevin Ronnie, Editorial, Lobbyists Challenge No-Contibution Law, HARTFORD
COURANT, Aug. 27, 2006, at C3.
415
See Complaint at 3, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass'n v. Garfield, No. 3:06-cv-02005 (D.
Conn. Dec. 15, 2006), available at http://www.sia.com/ct-lawsuit/pdf/SIFMAComplaint
.pdf.
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state contractors on the Internet violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of the relatives. 4 16 The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction barring the publication of the names. 4 17 The suit also
attacked the validity of the statute's restrictions on the campaign finance activities of state contractors (and prospective state contractors)
on First Amendment grounds. 4 i8 On January 2, 2007, District Court
Judge Stefan R. Underhill orally granted the preliminary injunction
with respect to posting the names of children on the Internet, issued a
written order the following day, 4 19 and subsequently issued a memorandum of decision explaining his decision. 4 20 SIFMA then indicated
that it "look[ed] forward to working with the state to find a solution
that ensures the safety and privacy of children and serves the public
interest." 42 1 Subsequently, in February 2007, SIFMA moved to volun423
tarily dismiss its case, 4 22 and Judge Underhill granted the motion.
E.

Massachusetts
1.

Massachusetts Clean Elections Law

In 1998, Massachusetts voters approved the Massachusetts Clean
Elections Law. 424 The law provided for a voluntary system of full public funding, but differed in important respects from the Maine and
Arizona systems. Like the Arizona system, coverage under the Massachusetts law was to be wider in scope than in the Maine public funding system and included candidates for governor, lieutenant
governor, attorney general, treasurer, receiver general, state secretary,
42 5
auditor, councilor, state house, and state senate.
The Massachusetts public funding system, however, imposed different requirements on candidates who wished to participate in the
public funding system. Instead of a blanket restriction on private and
in-kind fundraising, a participating candidate could accept limited
See id.
417 See id. at 3, 21.
418 See id. at 3.
419 See Sec. Indus. &Fin. Mkts. Ass'n, No. 3:06-cv-02005 (D. Conn. Jan. 3, 2007) (ordering preliminary injunction).
420 See Sec. Indus. &Fin. Mkts. Ass'n, No. 3:06-cv-02005, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2028 (D.
Conn. Jan. 9, 2007) (mem.).
421 Press Release, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass'n, Federal Judge Grants Preliminary
Injunction in SIFMA Suit to Protect Privacy of Children (Jan. 2, 2007), http://www.sia
.com/SIFMA Press/2006_press-releases/37212408.html.
422 See Sec. Indus. &Fin. Mkts. Ass'n, No. 3:06-cv-02005 (D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2007) (notice
of voluntary dismissal without prejudice).
423
See Sec. Indus. &Fin. Mkts. Ass'n, No. 3:06-cv-02005 (D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2007) (ordering dismissal of case).
424 See An Act the Massachusetts Clean Elections Law, 1998 Mass. Legis. Serv. ch. 395
(West) (codified at MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 55A (Supp. 2002)) (repealed 2003).
425 See MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 55A, § 1 (Supp. 2002) (repealed 2003).
416
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private funds;42 6 donations of up to $100 from any individual, PAC, or
political party per election cycle; 42 7 and limited in-kind contribu-

tions. 428 The total levels of permissible private and in-kind contributions were capped based on the office sought. 429 The chart below
indicates the maximum private contributions that the Massachusetts
law permitted.
TABLE

7.

ALLOWABLE PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS FOR SELECTED
MASSACHUSETTS STATE OFFICES

Office
Allowable Private Contributions
Governor
$450,000
Lieutenant Governor
$112,000
Attorney General
$150,000
State Senator
$18,000
State Representative
$6,000
Source: MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 55A, § 9 (Supp. 2002) (repealed 2003).

To participate in the Massachusetts public funding system, a candidate had to raise a certain number of "qualifying contributions" of
at least $5 made during a specified qualifying period. 4 30 The required
number of contributions varied based on the particular office, 4 3 1 and
the qualifying contributions counted toward the candidate's allowable
private contribution totals. 432 In contrast to the Maine and Arizona
public funding programs, the qualifying contributions were to go directly to the candidate instead of into the general Clean Elections coffers. 433 Additionally, the participating candidate could not accept

more than a low level of in-kind contributions (from political committees and individuals only), with the permissible level set based on the
office sought. 434 Moreover, all funds expended on the campaign had

to come from the limited private fundraising and in-kind contribu435
tions combined with the public fund disbursements.
The chart below sets forth the maximum public-fund disbursements under the Massachusetts program as enacted.
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435

See id. ch. 55A, § 9.
See id. ch. 55A, § 1.
See id. ch. 55A, § 10.
See id. ch. 55A, §§ 9(a), 10(b).
See id. ch. 55A, § 1.
See id. ch. 55A, § 4.
See id. ch. 55A, § 9.
See id. ch. 55A, § 24; supra note 85 and accompanying text.
See MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 55A, § 10.
See id. ch. 55A, § 2(a).
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TABLE 8.

MAXIMUM PUBLIC FUNDS DISTRIBUTIONS FOR SELECTED
MASSACHUSETTS OFFICES

Office

Primary Election

OfieUncontested

Contested Seat

Governor

Primary
General
Election
Ucnetd Election General ElectionGe
ranctsedEcio
tt
Sel
Uncontested
Contested Seat

Seat

$1,500,000

$750,000

$1,050,000

$525,000

Lieutenant Governor

$383,000

$191,500

$255,000

$127,500

Attorney General

$360,000

$180,000

$240,000

$120,000

State Senator

$43,000

$21,500

$29,000

$14,500

State Representative

$15,000

$7,500

$9,000

$4,500

Source: MASS.

GEN.

LAws ch. 55A, §§ 7, 8 (Supp. 2002) (repealed 2003).

The Massachusetts program also had a matching fund provision
that made a candidate eligible for matching funds if a nonparticipating opponent exceeded the expenditure limits set for the participating candidates. 43 6 As in the Maine and Arizona public funding
systems, matching funds were triggered by disclosure requirements
placed on nonparticipating opponents. 437 Following Maine's example, the matching funds limit was capped at twice the initial distribution to the participating candidate. 4 38 The Massachusetts program,
however, did not provide funds to match independent expenditures.
The public funding system was to be funded largely by legislative appropriations and supplemented by fines and penalties for campaign
439
finance law violations, among other things.
2.

Status of the Massachusetts System

Something rather dramatic happened after Massachusetts voters
approved the statute. In 2002, the first cycle in which the statute was
to take effect, many candidates indicated that they intended to participate in the system. 440 However, later that year, the state legislature
refused to release any funds that had been previously appropriated to
the Clean Elections system and subsequently passed a budget that did
not include an allocation for the public funding system. 44 1 The system never had a chance to operate.
A legal battle ensued between supporters of the full public funding system and the state legislature. An organization called Massachusetts Voters for Clean Elections sued the legislature, and the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the legislature had to
436

See id. ch. 55A, § 11.

437

See id.

438
440

See id.
See MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 10, § 42.
See, e.g., Micah L. Sifry, Fire Sale, IN THESE TIMES, May 27, 2002, at 3, 3-4.

441

See id. at 4.

439
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either repeal the law or fully fund the program. 442 The legislature
"refused to do either," and "the court. . . [gave] clean elections advocates the unprecedented power to seize state property and auction it
off to raise the money needed to fund candidates' campaigns." 443 Fac-

ing this untenable situation, the Massachusetts legislature repealed
the statute.

444

Presently, Massachusetts reformers are advocating passage of a
new law that would create a system very similar to the public funding
445
system in Maine.
F.

Vermont
1.

Vermont's Public Finance System

Vermont enacted comprehensive campaign finance reforms in
These reforms included the creation of a voluntary public
system
for the offices of governor and lieutenant governor,
funding
low contribution limits, and a system of expenditure limits for nonpar4 47
ticipating candidates.
1997.446

2.

Legal Challenges and Subsequent Operation of the Vermont System

As soon as the district court declared the statute's expenditure
limits unconstitutional, 448 that portion of the law became ineffective
pending judicial reinstatement. The Supreme Court's ruling in Randall v. Sorrell,44 9 however, rendered the limits permanently ineffective.
The district court's ruling also made political party and corporation
contribution limits ineffective, but the Second Circuit's reversal of the
district court made the limits effective again. Finally, the Supreme
Court's ruling in Randallagain struck down the limits. All other provisions of the law have been in full effect since the legislature passed the
statute, including the public financing programs for gubernatorial
and lieutenant governor candidates.
442

See Bates v. Dir. of the Office of Campaign and Political Fin., 763 N.E.2d 6, 7 (Mass.

2002).
Sifry, supra note 440, at 4.
See The Massachusetts Clean Elections Law: M.G.L. c. 55A, http-//www.mass.gov/
ocpf/chap55/55a.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
445
See PUB. FIN. BIL. (Common Cause, Proposed Tentative Draft 2007) (on file with
author).
446
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
447
See An Act Relating to Public Financing of Election Campaigns, 1997 Vt. Acts &
Resolves 64 (codified at Vermont Campaign Reform Finance Act of 1997, VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, §§ 2801-2883 (2002)).
448
See Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 463-64 (D. Vt. 2000); see also supra notes
49-50 and accompanying text (discussing the district court's opinion).
449
See Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006); see also supra text accompanying notes
52-59 (discussing the Supreme Court's opinion).
443

444
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Vermont's public financing system prohibits a candidate seeking
public funding from raising or spending more than $2,000 before
February 15 of the general election year; announcing his candidacy
before February 15; and soliciting, accepting, or expending any contributions except for qualifying contributions and public funding
grants unless there is a shortfall in the public financing fund. 451, During the specified qualifying period, a gubernatorial candidate must
collect at least $35,000 from a minimum of 1,500 qualified individual
contributors who each donate a maximum of $50. 4 5 1 A candidate for

lieutenant governor must collect at least $17,500 from a minimum of
750 qualified individual contributors who each give a maximum of
$50.452 Challenger gubernatorial candidates who meet these requirements are eligible for $75,000 in public funds for the primary and an
additional $225,000 for the general election. 45 3 Challenger candidates for lieutenant governor are eligible for $25,000 in public funds
4 54
for the primary and an additional $75,000 for the general election.
Incumbent governors and lieutenant governors who qualify for partic45 5
ipation are entitled to 85% of the amount allocated for challengers.
3.

Limited Results from the Vermont GubernatorialElections

During the 2000 election cycle, Douglas Racine, Vermont's lieutenant governor, used public funding and was reelected. 45 6 In addition, Anthony Pollina of the Progressive Party ran for governor using
public funds. 45 7 Howard Dean, the Democratic candidate, initially accepted public funds but withdrew from the program (and returned
the public funds) after "cit[ing] concerns that his Republican opponent was receiving enormous amounts of money, much of it from outof-state groups, and that the recent court ruling [in Landell] left him
no way to keep up."4 58 Although no candidates used public funds

during the 2002 election, 4 59 in 2004 Steve Hingtgen of the Progressive
4 60
Party used public funding in his bid for lieutenant governor.
See tit. 17, § 2853.
See id. § 2854(a)(1).
452
See id. § 2854(a)(2).
453
See id. § 2855(b)(1).
454
See id. § 2855(b) (2).
455
See id. § 2855(b)(3).
456
See BRESLOW ET AL., supra note 87, at 20.
457
See id. See generally Frasco, supra note 20, at 123-27 (discussing the effect of public
funding on third-party candidates).
458
BRESLOW ET AL., supra note 87, at 20.
459
See Vt. Sec'y of State, Summary of Use of Public Finance Grants by Candidate,
http://Vernont-elections.org/electionsl /VTpublicfinancegrants4112005.htm (last visited
Feb. 17, 2007).
460
See id.
450
451
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III
AN EFFECTIVE AND LEGALLY VIABLE MODEL OF FULL
PUBLIC FUNDING

Thus far, courts have upheld the main components of the full
public funding systems that are currently operating in Maine and Arizona, which are the two systems that comply with Buckley. The nonBuckley-compliant aspect of the Vermont system failed to withstand
constitutional attack, but the Buckley-compliant public funding program remains valid. The Massachusetts public funding system faltered
for reasons independent of the judicial system, and the challenges to
the North Carolina system are still pending. These court decisions
and initial evaluations of the existing models provide meaningful guidance for the design of an effective and legally viable model of full
public funding systems for other states, localities, and perhaps even
the nation.
A.

Components to Maximize the Effectiveness of the Proposed
Model

The full public funding "experiments" conducted at the state
level indicate that a full public funding system should include seven
key components to maximize its reform potential. 461 First, a state
public funding system should-like the systems in Maine and Arizona-cover the state legislature, the office of the governor, all statewide-elected officials, and-like the system in North Carolinaencompass judicial offices as well. 4 62 A larger public funding system
results in more candidates and subsequently elected officials who are
free from the encumbrances of private fundraising and the resultant
influence of large donors. More candidates and elected officials are
thus able to spend time on the issues and with their constituents,
rather than raising money.
Second, the model should adopt Maine, Arizona, North Carolina,
and Connecticut's approach to candidate qualification and require
that candidates collect a certain number of low-level financial contributions within a specified qualifying period. This requirement effectively restricts the distribution of scarce public funds to serious
candidates, an essential component of the credibility and financial viai]
461 Justice Louis Brandeis once observed that "[ t is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Maine, Arizona, and North Carolina are conducting such "experiments" in the area of
campaign finance, and Connecticut will begin its "experiment" in 2008.
462
For an explanation of the importance of publicly financed judicial elections, see
Kotey, supra note 306.
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bility of any public funding program. Indeed, the Buckley Court specifically upheld this gatekeeper requirement. 46 3 Additionally,
qualifying contributions should go directly into the public financing
fund, as the Maine system requires, rather than directly to the candidates, as the Arizona system suggests.
Third, to assist candidates with collecting qualifying contributions, states should permit participating candidates to accept limited
private money contributions in the form of seed money at the outset
of their campaigns. Like the Maine public funding system, however, a
public funding system should restrict these limited private contributions to individuals only; subject the contributions to low contribution
limits (e.g., $100 per person), including the candidate and the candidate's family; and subject the contributions to low-level aggregate limits determined by the particular office sought. By limiting the levels of
individual seed money contributions and by imposing aggregate-level
caps on such monies, the concerns about the undue influence of large
donors are substantially alleviated. Additionally, participating candidates should only be able to accept this limited private money during
the period preceding their acceptance of public funds. Once a candidate accepts public funding, the candidate must agree not to accept
any additional contributions, including any contributions from the
candidate personally or the candidate's family, as well as any private
contributions and any in-kind contributions. A model state system
would thus limit a candidate's campaign spending to initial private
seed money combined with the eventual public funds disbursement.
Fourth, an effective system should ensure that the public funds
that the system disburses to candidates are sufficient to win an election. As this Note observes, the Maine, Arizona, and North Carolina
systems have substantially achieved this objective. 464 If the system cannot provide a competitive level of support, it will suffer from the same
465
types of problems that plagued the partial public financing systems.
The appropriate funding levels, of course, would depend on the state
in which the system is based. States would have to determine the
funding level by evaluating historical data on the typical costs of winning a particular elected office in that state. Moreover, as in the
Maine, Arizona and North Carolina systems, public funding disbursements should be the same for major-party candidates and third- or
minor-party candidates. Providing lower disbursements to minor- or
third-party candidates, as in the recently passed Connecticut system,
creates less of an incentive for these candidates to participate in the
public funding system and run for office. In addition, this creates the
463
464
465

See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96-97 (1976) (per curiam).
See supra Parts II.A.2, II.B.2, II.C.2.
See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
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risk that the monies that the system disburses to minor- or third-party
candidates might be insufficient to win election. Both of these factors
will limit the system's potential to increase minor- or third-party participation. In turn, this limits the system's overall ability to enhance
electoral competition, which is one of the main goals of a public funding system.
Fifth, an effective system must provide matching funds to participating candidates when nonparticipating or personally financed opponents outspend them and to participating candidates who are the
target of independent expenditures. Unless a matching fund mechanism exists, a wealthy opponent or a barrage of independent expenditures by third-party groups could easily defeat the utility of the public
funding program.
Sixth, because one of the main concerns regarding the effectiveness of public funding systems is the ability of states to pay for them, a
successful public funding system should draw its resources from a variety of sources, thus ensuring a more diversified and stable revenue
stream. Failure to do so will put any potential public funding system
at risk, as demonstrated by the failed reform program in Massachusetts. The system should include several options for taxpayers and not
merely limit taxpayers to a low, preset tax check-off. The model
should instead include tax check-offs at multiple levels. For example,
a tax form should allow check-off contributions to the public funding
system of $3, $6, or $9, instead of limiting the potential allocation to
$3. In conjunction with the multilevel tax check-off, the model
should include a multilevel tax addon option. For example, the taxpayer should be given the option to contribute voluntarily an extra $3,
$6, $9, or any other amount in taxes to help fund the system. Given
the importance of campaign finance reform, it is likely that at least a
certain portion of the population either would want more of their tax
liability to apply to public funding programs or would choose volunta466
rily to contribute a few extra dollars to fund the system.
The model should also raise the fines for violations of the campaign finance law and contribute 100% of the proceeds from the fines
toward the public funding system. Higher fines would theoretically
strengthen the deterrent effect of the laws while simultaneously providing more funds for the system.
The model should also include voluntary $50 contributions requested from lobbyists when they register and from attorneys when
they pay their license tax. Furthermore, it is critical that the state legislature, as in Maine and Arizona's models, commits to allocating a
466 An example of this type of behavior is the multitude of customers who voluntarily
pay an extra $1 or $2 at the supermarket or drug store to donate to a charity or community
organization. I believe the same phenomenon would likely apply here.
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certain amount of funds in the annual budget toward the operation of
the system. This act by the state legislature demonstrates a commitment to the system itself by the very people whom the public funding
system is intended to regulate while simultaneously helping to ensure
the continued financial viability of the program.
Finally, educating potential candidates, elected officials, and the
public about the existence, goals, operation, and results of the public
funding system is critical to the program's effectiveness and success.
The more widespread the public's knowledge of the public funding
system, the more likely it is that citizens will believe in the fairness and
integrity of the democratic process and subsequently, the fairness and
integrity of their state government. Additionally, because the public
funding systems appear to enable a greater number and wider variety
of citizens to run for office, 4 6 7 the larger the system, the more opportunities there are for people to run for office. Moreover, as public
funding programs expand and candidates grow more aware of their
existence and benefits, participation in the system will likely increase.
Similarly, as public awareness of the system and its goals grows, taxpayers will likely be increasingly willing to check off part of their taxes to
the program or even add on additional money to support the
program.
B.

Components to Maximize the Legal Viability of the Proposed
Model

A full public funding system must withstand legal challenges in
order to fulfill the goals of reform. This Note's model proposes nine
critical components to strengthen the legal viability of a public funding model.
First, pursuant to May v. McNally, the public fund distribution
mechanism must be viewpoint neutral. Without viewpoint neutrality,
the program is susceptible to attack on First Amendment grounds.
Second, to avoid attack under the Equal Protection Clause, as in
Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield, public funding disbursements
should be equivalent for major-party candidates and minor- or third46 8
party candidates.
Third, the matching fund mechanisms should have limits. Daggett and the Arizona cases establish that two or three times the initial
distribution is an acceptable limit. Courts may view an unrestricted
matching fund mechanism as conferring a disproportionate benefit
on a participating candidate, thus elevating the public funding system
See Frasco, supra note 20, at 112-38.
This requirement will also enable more minor- and third-party candidates to run
competitively for elected office, thereby increasing electoral competition.
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to a level of impermissible coercion in violation of the free speech
rights of nonparticipating candidates. Ideally, the limit would be
three times the initial distribution, but a state's budget constraints
may force the limit to be twice the initial distribution.
Fourth, Daggett implies that simple statutory terminology might
confer a "substantial benefit" to participating candidates that rises to
the level of impermissible coercion. Therefore, to avoid any prospective complications, the enacting statute or ballot initiative, in addition
to the government body responsible for administering the program,
should refer to the program as a system of "full public funding" or
"full public financing" and avoid terms like "clean elections." The
statute or the administering body should similarly refer to candidates
who accept public funds as "participating" candidates, not "clean" candidates. Furthermore, although the statute and administering body
can certainly encourage participation in the system, neither should
give any indication, express or implied, that "participating" candidates
are in any way better than "nonparticipating" candidates.
Fifth, National Right to Life in Maine and Lavis in Arizona both
demonstrate the potential legal pitfalls associated with charging lobbyists mandatory registration fees or surcharges and imposing
mandatory surcharges on civil and criminal fines. To avoid these concerns, these fees and surcharges should instead be voluntary contributions, as in the proposed model.
Sixth, Myers suggests that either the public should elect members
of the funding system's administering body or the governor should
have the sole power to appoint these members. Other schemes may
implicate or violate the separation of powers doctrine. Additionally,
the program should limit removal power to the governor, requiring at
most the consent of the state senate.
Seventh, Daggett teaches that the full public funding system must
carefully balance the incentives and benefits of participation in the
program with meaningful detriments and burdens of participation.
This should be an identifiable theme throughout the program. The
creators and administrators of the program must keep this balance in
mind and ensure that the program explicitly reflects this balance.
Otherwise, as the Daggett court suggests, a lack of balance may
threaten the First Amendment rights of nonparticipating candidates
and contributors.
Eighth, Jackson emphasizes the importance of carefully structuring reporting requirements for nonparticipating candidates. These
requirements should be narrowly tailored to advance identifiable and
compelling interests, including general anticorruption interests but
also interests specific to the public financing program. In addition,
creators and administrators of public financing programs must always
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be cognizant of the reporting burdens imposed on nonparticipating
candidates.
Lastly, supporters of full public funding programs should emphasize the holding and reasoning of Daggett in any pertinent litigation,
given the North Carolina district court's reliance on the opinion in
Jackson, and the Arizona district court's almost complete deference to
the opinion in American Physicians.
CONCLUSION

Maine, Arizona, and North Carolina's full public funding systems
are comprehensive and ambitious attempts to guarantee the integrity
and fairness of the American political process. In this respect, Maine,
Arizona, and North Carolina are truly operating as "laboratories of
democracy" for other states and for the nation as a whole. 469 The

initial results of these systems are encouraging; the response by participating candidates and elected officials is overwhelmingly positive,
and all three systems have withstood all major legal challenges in the
courts.
In light of the initial successes of Maine, Arizona, and North Carolina's experiments in full public funding, the path is now clear for
the rest of the states-and ultimately the nation-to adopt full public
funding systems. The system proposed in this Note aims to provide a
model for states to achieve this objective. Because courts have upheld
all of the components of the proposed model, the model is one that
combines effective tools for reform with the ability to withstand legal
challenges. The time may have finally come for comprehensive campaign finance reform in the United States-a true system of "clean
elections."
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See supra note 461.
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